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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ON THE BENCH:
A SURVEY OF FORTY-TWO JUDGES ON THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Abbe R. Gluck∗ & Richard A. Posner∗∗
This Article reports the results of a survey of a diverse group of forty-two federal appellate
judges concerning their approaches to statutory interpretation. The study reveals
important differences between their approaches and the approach that the Supreme Court
purports to take. It also helps to substantiate the irrelevance of the enduring, but nowboring, textualism-versus-purposivism debate. None of the judges we interviewed was
willing to associate himself or herself with “textualism” without qualification. All consult
legislative history. Most eschew dictionaries. All utilize at least some canons of
construction, but for reasons that range from “window dressing,” to the use of canons to
assist in opinion writing, to a view that they are useful decision tools. Most of the judges
we interviewed are not fans of Chevron, except for the judges on the D.C. Circuit, which
hears the bulk of Chevron cases. Some of the judges interviewed believe that
understanding Congress is important to a judge’s work, while others do not see how judges
can use such understanding to decide cases. Most express doubt that the Supreme Court’s
interpretive methodology binds the lower courts. The younger judges, who attended law
school and practiced during the ascendance of textualism, are generally more formalist
and accepting of the canons of construction, regardless of political affiliation. The older
judges are less focused on canons, take a broader view of their delegated authority, and
appear to grapple more with questions of judicial legitimacy.
The approach that emerged most clearly from our interviews might be described as
intentional eclecticism. Most of the judges we spoke to are willing to consider many
different kinds of argument and evidence, and defend that approach as the only
democratically legitimate one. Yet at the same time many observe a gap between how they
actually decide cases and how they write opinions, a gap they attribute to the disconnect
between the expectations of the public and the realities of judicial decisionmaking.

I. INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of statutory interpretation cases are resolved by
the federal courts of appeals, not by the Supreme Court, even though
the Supreme Court’s practice has received nearly all of the attention
from academics and practitioners. In part due to this myopia, the Court
and many academics have been mired for decades in a by-now boring
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Solomon Center for Health Law and Policy, Yale Law
School.
∗∗ Former Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, currently President of
Team Posner, Inc., a company that focuses on assisting pro se legal claimants. We are very grateful
to the judges we interviewed for their candor and generosity. Special thanks also to Bill Eskridge,
Patricia Goldrick, David Pozen, Amy Semet, participants at the Columbia Law School Faculty
Workshop, and Yale Law School students Leslie Arffa, Miriam Becker-Cohen, Samir Doshi, Carter
Greenberg, Yume Hoshijima, Julie Hutchinson, Philipp Kotlaba, Michael Morse, Max Siegel, and
Matthew Sipe.
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debate about “textualism” versus “purposivism.” That debate, while ostensibly about the judge’s relationship to Congress and its work, has
centered in practice on little more than the most appropriate evidentiary
tools of interpretation: text, statutory purpose, legislative history, interpretive presumptions, and so on. Many contend that these arguments
have reached détente, with most Justices now unabashedly of the “textfirst” persuasion, opting for dictionaries, interpretive presumptions, and,
only after those materials, a much stingier approach to legislative history. This shift is well captured by Justice Kagan’s penchant for proclaiming, like many academics, that “we’re all textualists now.”1
This does not seem to be the state of affairs in the courts of appeals.
(It is doubtful that it is the true state of affairs in the Supreme Court
either, but the Court is not our focus.) This Article reports the results
of a survey of forty-two federal appellate judges regarding their approaches to statutory interpretation, including their consideration of
statutory text, dictionaries, the canons of construction, legislative history, and purpose. We also asked them about, among other things, pragmatism, the role of administrative agencies in statutory interpretation,
and the value to judges of understanding how Congress works.
The courts of appeals have an obvious importance for everyday legal
practice. Additionally motivating our study are several recent trends in
case law and scholarship. First, the interpretive presumptions favored
by the Supreme Court — the “canons of construction” — have taken
precedence over legislative history not only in Supreme Court opinions
but also in the now-widespread teaching of legislation in law schools.2
Second, some Justices and academics have claimed that the textualist
approach has brought a salutary formalism to statutory interpretation3 — a predictable methodology — even though the Supreme Court
has not organized the rules in any hierarchy and does not treat its methodological rules as binding precedent on the lower courts.4 Third, two
areas of academic scholarship quite relevant to the everyday work of
federal appellate judges in statutory interpretation have gained traction
in recent years — scholarship (and recent judicial opinions) criticizing
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1 Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of
Statutes at 8:28 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg [https://
perma.cc/7DAR-XEEN].
2 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA F. NOURSE,
STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION (2014); JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C.
STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION (2d ed. 2013); Abbe R. Gluck, The Ripple Effect
of “Leg-Reg” on the Study of Legislation & Administrative Law in the Law School Curriculum, 65
J. LEGAL EDUC. 121 (2015); John F. Manning & Matthew Stephenson, Legislation & Regulation
and Reform of the First Year, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45, 59 (2015).
3 E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997);
John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 123–24.
4 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1765–66 (2010).
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Chevron5 deference to agency statutory interpretations6 and scholarship
on the mismatch between the realities of the congressional drafting practices and the assumptions the Supreme Court makes about how
Congress works.7 We wondered how, and if, federal appellate judges
have been thinking about all of these issues.
Our study reveals important differences between the approaches of
the appellate judges and the approach the Supreme Court purports to
take. None of the forty-two judges whom we interviewed — judges
from across the political and theoretical spectrum — was willing to associate himself or herself with “textualism” without qualification. All
consult legislative history. Many eschew dictionaries. Many of them
utilize at least some canons of construction, but for reasons that range
from “window dressing,” to canons as vehicles of opinion writing, to a
view that they are actually useful decision tools. Most of them are not
fans of Chevron, with the significant exception of the judges we interviewed from the D.C. Circuit, the court that hears the most Chevron
cases. Some believe that understanding Congress is important to the
judge’s work; others do not see how courts can apply such understanding or think it unwise to do so. Virtually all expressed doubt that the
Supreme Court’s interpretive methodology binds the lower courts, except that all consider Chevron — itself an interpretive rule — binding
on them. The younger judges, most of whom were educated under the
modern legislation curriculum, were generally more focused on, and accepting of, the canons of construction. The older judges, in contrast,
were generally less focused on canons and took a broader view of their
own authority, the legitimacy of which they viewed as coming from the
delegation of legislative interpretation to courts.
The approach that emerged most clearly from our interviews is not
a single approach at all but rather what might be described as intentional eclecticism. As we elaborate in the next Part of the Article, most
of the judges we spoke to are willing to consider many different kinds
of material. They told us it was “defensible to gather as much information as you can to make the best-informed decision you can” and that
they eschewed an “ecclesiastical” ideology. Many acknowledged the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
5
6

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (arguing Chevron is unconstitutional); Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts
Court: Still Failing After All These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731 (2014) (arguing Chevron has
failed to accomplish its goals); Catherine M. Sharkey, Address at the George Mason Center for the
Study of the Administrative State Rethinking Judicial Deference Conference: In the Wake of
Chevron’s Retreat (June 2, 2016) (discussing ways in which the Court has retreated from Chevron),
https://vimeo.com/169758592 [https://perma.cc/38RU-X7EZ].
7 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside — An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons (pts. 1 & 2), 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I], 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014) [hereinafter
Gluck & Bressman, Part II] (reporting on the findings of a survey of 137 congressional staffers and
finding a disconnect between the Court’s assumptions and drafters’ understandings and practices).
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need for pragmatism — judging with common sense and an eye on consequences. Some judges offered a frank acknowledgment that sometimes the work of statutory interpretation is “quasi-legislative.”
And while no judge would proclaim him or herself a “purposivist” — Justice Scalia and the textualists have too successfully denigrated
that term for most to embrace it — many do seem to adopt an approach
more closely associated with congressional intent than many commentators (or judges) typically acknowledge. What we heard, even from
very text-centric judges, was not support of “activist” purposivism as
Justice Scalia would cast it, but rather a cabined approach that seeks to
implement what Congress was trying to do, using all available tools to
confirm the judge’s interpretation.
We did still find different areas of emphasis among judges, even
though most of them claim to consult the same array of sources. We put
aside the labels “textualist” and “purposivist” as unhelpful in addressing
the differences among the judges. Those concepts are equally unhelpful
in addressing what are, in our view, the most pressing questions of modern statutory interpretation, including the courts’ relationship to
Congress and the inevitability of gaps, unanswered questions, and errors
in today’s complex, massive statutes.
We instead suggest alternate ways to think about differences among
the judges that might be more illuminating, with the caveat that a few
judges straddle categories.8 In sorting among the suggested categories,
we found two factors in particular — the judge’s generation and
whether he or she had previous work experience on Capitol Hill — to
be more important than any ideological affiliation as conservative or
liberal. D.C. Circuit judges seem to be a category of their own.
1. Eclectic Textualists. — These judges take a stingy, even negative,
view of Congress. They prefer a textual approach where possible but,
significantly, are not the same kind of textualist as Justice Scalia was.
These eclectic textualists are still willing to consult broader context, purpose, canons, and even legislative history. Only four of the judges we
interviewed were this type of judge, and they were the most text-centric.
2. Legal Process Institutionalists: The Older Generation. — These
judges tend to be older and less focused on the realities of the congressional lawmaking process or canons and more focused on the question
of delegation by Congress to courts. They are interested, in the tradition
of the Legal Process movement of the 1950s, in “inherent authority” and
the institutional “legitimacy” of the federal courts in answering questions
left open by Congress.9 These judges are the most likely to describe the
judicial role as sometimes being “quasi-legislative.” They do not ignore
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
8 One judge whom we interviewed did not fit into any of them well and is not included in the
tallies for this typology.
9 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 4–5 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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statutory text and indeed many emphasize it, but they aim to make sense
of the law within those confines and will consult whatever materials
assist. We identified nineteen such judges in our sample.
3. Ex-Staffers: The Congressionalists. — These judges are strongly
influenced by previous experience working in either the executive or
legislative branch of the federal government. They are interested in how
Congress works, do not assume that Congress is able to draft statutes
perfectly, and therefore focus on legislative materials and purpose, in
addition to text and canons. But they differ from what courts and academics have called “purposivists” — the category of judges typically set
up as the textualists’ opposites. “Purposivists” are often described as
willing to interpret a statute beyond its text or original intent to accomplish Congress’s goal. Justice Breyer, the current Justice most closely
associated with purposivism, is indeed willing to interpret a statute beyond its four corners to “make the law work better.”10 But unlike our
ex-staffer/congressionalist judges, many purposivists, including Justice
Breyer (himself a former staffer), have shown little interest in the realities of the lawmaking process. Our ex-staffer/congressionalists also differ from traditional purposivists in that many of these judges are more
textualist (several are very closely associated with that approach in public). They deploy textualism’s preferred tools, including canons, along
with legislative history, with a “common sense” understanding of how
Congress works. We identified eight judges in our sample who adopt
this ex-staffer approach.
4. Post-Scalia Canonists. — Some of the judges unquestionably have
been influenced by changes in legal education and statutory litigation
over the past three decades. As recently as the early 1980s, litigants
complained that they had little help from theorists, judges, or academics
on what legal principles to use to frame statutory cases.11 Statutory
interpretation was not a field viewed as intellectually vibrant; it was not
taught in law schools.12 The textualists, who advocated a more formalist approach, are largely credited with the doctrinalization of the field.13
Textualists advanced the canons, in particular, as a more objective and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
10
11

STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 74 (2010).
See Philip P. Frickey, Lecture, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242 (1992) (“Practitioners of [the 1970s] who sought
guidance on statutory interpretation found little available.”).
12 Id. (“[T]he general curricular mood was one of benign neglect . . . .”).
13 See John F. Manning, Legal Realism & The Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283, 290
(2002) (“Because textualists believe in a strong version of legislative supremacy, their skepticism
about actual intent or purpose has predictably inspired renewed emphasis on the canons of interpretation, particularly the linguistic or syntactic canons of interpretation.”); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532–33 (2013) (reviewing
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS (2012)).
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coordinating set of tools for resolving statutory disputes than alternatives like legislative history,14 and now Justices of all interpretive stripes
use them in most statutory cases.15 Justice Scalia’s last book on statutory interpretation, with Professor Bryan Garner, was exclusively about
the canons.16 This doctrinalization has facilitated the teaching of legislation in most law schools — some even in the first-year core curriculum — where the canons are a central part of the materials taught.17
Many of the younger judges we interviewed had indeed been taught
the canons in law school and practiced law using them, and some had
taught law school classes about them. They told us they cannot stop the
canons from “popping in [their] mind[s].” Some are former staffers and
so recognize the canons’ tension with some aspects of congressional
drafting, even as they find the canons helpful as tiebreakers in deciding
cases or reaching consensus with colleagues. We identified ten judges
in our sample with this “Post-Scalia” canonist mindset, though we note
that almost all of them emphasize other considerations, such as pragmatism, more than Justice Scalia did.
5. D.C. Circuit Judges. — The D.C. Circuit judges we interviewed
fall into the categories outlined above but they begin cases very differently from all of the others. For them, every statutory question begins
with the threshold question of deference to an administrative agency.
As we detail in Part II, that process gives them a different perspective
on their role.
We return to these categories in the pages that follow, as we detail
the findings. We now proceed to an overview of our study. We then
discuss the judges’ responses by topic, and offer our observations about
the study’s implications for the field of statutory interpretation. The
Article concludes with summaries of some representative interviews.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
Our interest in this study grew out of the intersection of our previous
work on statutory interpretation. Posner has written extensively about
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
14
15

See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 433–36 (2005).
See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 922, 994–95 (2016) (cataloging the rates at which various Justices relied on interpretive canons and tools of construction across
five-and-a-half terms). Professor Nina Mendelson’s empirical study, the summary results of which
are forthcoming in the Michigan Law Review, has found that all current Justices except Justice
Gorsuch (who was too new to study) applied at least one canon with approval in most majority
opinions they authored in cases resolving statutory issues. Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation,
and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s
First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2018).
16 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13.
17 Gluck, supra note 2, at 157.
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how judges decide cases.18 Gluck’s work has focused on the role of
doctrine in statutory interpretation and what linkages exist between the
interpretive doctrines applied by courts and the way that Congress actually works.19 Following on the Gluck-Bressman empirical survey of
137 congressional counsels — which asked staffers about their
knowledge of and agreement with the assumptions about legislation that
the Supreme Court applies to statutory cases — we thought it would be
illuminating to survey federal appellate judges about their own approaches and their views of Congress, the Court, and the prevailing interpretive doctrines. We also share a strong belief in the merits of turning more scholarly attention away from the Supreme Court and instead
to the everyday decisionmakers in the system.20
A. Methodology
In the summer of 2014, we received approval for this study from an
Institutional Review Board,21 and then sent letters of invitation to forty
federal court of appeals judges to participate in our survey. Judges were
assured that their identities would not be revealed and that all participants would be interviewed by one or both of us, either in person or
over the phone. Thirty of the judges accepted our invitation, and we
interviewed twenty-nine of them.22 Early in 2015, we invited thirteen
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
18 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008); RICHARD A. POSNER,
REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING (2013).
19 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and
the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011) (finding that federal courts of appeals do not treat
statutory interpretation doctrine as “law” as they would treat doctrine in other fields); Gluck, supra
note 4 (reporting the findings of a study of statutory interpretation in state courts); Gluck &
Bressman, Part I, supra note 7; Abbe R. Gluck et al., Essay, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015).
20 See, e.g., POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 18; Gluck, supra note 19 (focusing on
interaction between state courts and lower federal courts); Abbe R. Gluck, Essay, Intrastatutory
Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform
and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011) (focusing on state administrators and courts); Gluck, supra
note 4 (focusing on state courts). For a few exceptions to the myopic focus on the Court, see, for
example, FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007);
James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Dictionaries 2.0: Exploring the Gap Between the Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals, 125 YALE L.J.F. 104 (2015); James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum,
Protean Statutory Interpretation in the Courts of Appeals, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681 (2017)
[hereinafter Brudney & Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation]; and Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl &
Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215 (2012).
21 IRBs are ethics committees that monitor research involving “human subjects” for risk and
protect the rights of subjects. See YALE UNIV. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BDS., IRB POLICY
100 INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH PROTOCOLS
OR FDA-REGULATED ACTIVITIES INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS (2015), https://your.
yale.edu/sites/default/files/irb-policy-100-institutional-review-board-irb-review-human-subject.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6H4S-9RCX].
22 One judge wished to be interviewed only in person and we were unable to arrange a mutually
convenient time for travel to chambers.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3138249

2018]

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ON THE BENCH

1307

more judges to participate, and six accepted, bringing the tally to thirtyfive. In 2017, we used a random-number generator to select twenty-five
more judges. Of the judges randomly generated, seven were already in
our sample. We sent letters to the next ten on that list, and interviewed
three of them. We then reviewed our sample for diversity across many
metrics, including geography, age, gender, and race and invited another
ten judges to participate who we thought would make our sample more
representative; four responded and we interviewed them all, bringing
the final number to forty-two. About three-fourths of the interviews
took place over the phone, the rest in person. We initially divided the
interviews between the two of us but soon discovered that we preferred
interviewing together for ease of notetaking and comparing impressions.
All notes were taken by hand and there were no recordings; we surmised
most judges would not feel comfortable being audiotaped. Each interview lasted approximately one hour and followed the same script of
nineteen questions.23
We do not claim to have a random sample, but we did attempt to
speak with a diverse group of judges. Our invitation list included judges
from all of the federal courts of appeals, appointed by Presidents of both
parties; of different ages but having at least three years of service on the
federal appellate bench; of different races and genders; and with known
differences in interpretive methodologies. Where a circuit included a
judge known for his or her strong views on statutory interpretation, we
invited that judge but also invited another judge from the same circuit
with a different perspective. We also invited many judges not associated
with any particular perspective at all. Our goals were geographic, experiential, ideological, and demographic diversity. Notably, the judges
who were selected by the random-number-generation technique gave
responses that did not differ in any significant way from the judges who
were not.
There is always a risk of response bias in studies of this nature, and
we make no claim that our sample is representative or predictive. There
is also the possibility that judges do not do all of the interpretive work
that they claim they do, perhaps delegating much of it to law clerks.
The interviews might also have a performative aspect — judges may
have told us what they thought we wanted to hear. But as the interview
summaries suggest, the judges we interviewed seemed conscientious,
and how judges describe their own approaches, even if their descriptions
do not fully capture their actual approaches, is interesting. Most of the
judges with whom we spoke admitted at some point in the interview a
lack of knowledge, or not having thought deeply about an issue, or a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
23 After the first set of interviews, we made minor changes to clarify the wording of questions
about which the judges we interviewed had needed clarification. There were also four additional
questions that we experimented with using, but which ultimately were asked to only a handful of
judges, and so we do not include the answers as part of our results.
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lack of a coherent theory — a degree of candor that suggests they were
not posturing. We also compared interview responses across interviews
conducted by Posner alone, by Gluck alone, and by both together and
found no significant differences based on the interviewer.
In addition we examined a random sample of fifteen to twenty opinions of all of the judges whom we interviewed. Sampling allowed us to
see the variety of interpretive tools judges use, and thus allowed us to
compare to some extent how they describe their approaches to statutory
interpretation with what they actually do. Again, we do not make
claims of scientific precision. For judges who have written a great many
opinions, sampling cannot provide a complete snapshot of their interpretive approaches or what tools they use, in large part because there
are so many potential tools. Sampling was most helpful to disprove the
negative. For instance, sampling allowed us to see that even judges who
said they do not use canons, do. It allowed us to confirm, too, that all
of the judges consulted dictionaries and legislative history, as they told
us they did. For judges with many opinions, a much more detailed review of the opinions authored would be required to make more definitive claims.
As another check, we randomly selected half of the judges and surveyed all of their statutory interpretation majority opinions for possible
effects of judicial panels on certain interpretive methods. We examined
whether those judges used dictionaries or legislative history more or less
frequently depending on the composition of the panel by the party of
the appointing President. (We chose dictionaries and legislative history
as admittedly rough proxies for this test because they are the easiest-toidentify signals of a textualist and purposivist approach, respectively.24)
We could not infer any significant effects. But we did observe some
interesting patterns that might be worthy of exploration in the future.
For example, and perhaps unsurprising, eight of twelve liberal judges
used legislative history more often on panels with only liberal colleagues.
However, more surprising, three of twelve liberals used legislative history more frequently with conservatives; four of nine conservatives used
legislative history more on panels with only other conservatives, and
five of nine conservatives used dictionaries more frequently with liberals. On the whole, while no firm conclusions can be drawn from this
rudimentary examination, the exercise nevertheless was useful because
it both corroborated what judges told us they did — the judges who
stated in interviews that they rarely or often used these materials did
indeed rarely or often use them — and revealed relatively stable interpretive approaches across opinions.
Of the forty-two (out of the 169 sitting) federal court of appeals
judges whom we interviewed, eight were women (women comprise
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
24 We also normalized the results to correct for the fact that certain judges sat more frequently
on liberal, conservative, or mixed panels.
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slightly more than one third of judges on the courts of appeals); thirtytwo were (non-Latino) Caucasian (we interviewed ten out of the fortyeight non-Caucasian judges serving at the time of our study); nineteen
had been appointed to the court of appeals by a Republican President
and twenty-three by a Democratic President; and eight were under sixty
(The average age of all judges — active and senior — on the courts of
appeals is 71.2).25 All the courts of appeals except the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits (no judges from those circuits accepted our invitation)
were represented. Using another measure, our judges occupy a broad
ideological spectrum on the Judicial Common Space (JSC), an instrument that includes all Supreme Court Justices and Court of Appeals
judges who served between 1953 and 2013.26 Seventeen of the judges
we interviewed were estimated to be between the twenty-fifth and
seventy-fifth JCS percentiles, with eight estimated to be conservative
(above the median) and seven estimated to be liberal (below the median).
The twenty-five remaining judges exhibited more extreme ideological
preferences. Of those, eleven were estimated to be particularly conservative (above the seventy-fifth percentile) while fourteen were estimated to be particularly liberal (below the twenty-fifth percentile).
B. Summary of the Findings
Our interview questions drew from the current academic and judicial debates over statutory interpretation. Focusing first on the current
Supreme Court’s text-focused approach, we asked each judge about his
or her own approach to the Court’s favored tools, namely statutory text,
dictionaries, and the canons of construction. We then asked about legislative history and statutory purpose — tools of interpretation that academics have argued have fallen out of some favor in the federal courts,
largely due to the influence of textualism. We moved next to the newer
questions that have emerged in the field, including the relevance of understanding how Congress operates to the work of judges in statutory
cases,27 and whether it is the judge’s role to repair statutes — that is, to
make them more consistent or more sensible.28 We also asked about
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
25
26

Data on file with authors.
See Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007);
Micheal W. Giles, Research Note, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection
Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001). Judges who are estimated to be conservative are assigned to
a positive score, while those estimated to be liberal are assigned a negative one. The median JCS
score is .01. We categorized each judge interveiwed in reference to the twenty-fifth (-0.294) and
seventy-fifth (0.3055) JCS percentiles, creating four ideological types.
27 See generally Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 7; Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra
note 7.
28 Cf. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 352 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (noting that one method of interpreting a statement found in a constitutional or statutory text is to “infuse[] the statement with vitality and significance today”).
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another subject of Gluck’s research: the precedential weight of the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements about statutory interpretation.29
In addition, we asked about deference to federal agency statutory
interpretations; the role of lawyers and law clerks in statutory cases; and
how if at all statutory cases differ from other types of cases. We also
asked each judge how he or she had developed his or her own interpretive approach and what “one word” would best describe that approach.
Several months after the initial round of the survey concluded, we followed up with three additional questions, which were about the eclecticism we had observed, the propriety of updating old statutes, and how
a statutory interpretation decision gels in the judge’s mind in a particular case. Nineteen of the thirty-five judges interviewed before spring
2017 responded to the follow-up questions. All judges interviewed after
spring 2017 were asked the follow-up questions at the end of their initial
interview.
As a note, our survey questions do not track the questions that the
Gluck-Bressman survey posed to congressional staff. We did not think
it respectful to quiz the judges about their specific canon knowledge, or
productive to grill them on the particulars of the legislative process. Instead our questions for the judges were more topic-oriented, aimed to
open discussion.30
Several major themes emerge from the responses. First, what divides
judges is not what academics and judges think divides judges. None of
the judges is a “textualist” in the extreme sense of that word, or even in
the version of textualism that was practiced by Justice Scalia. Very few
judges told us they read the entire statute, or even begin their analysis
of statutory cases with the text of the statute. All of the judges use
legislative history. Dictionaries are mostly disfavored. Even when
asked to provide one word to describe their interpretive approaches, not
one judge was willing to self-describe as “textualist” without qualification. Even the text-centric judges described themselves in such terms
as “textualist-pragmatist” or “textualist-contextualist.” Our findings reveal the academic cliché de mode — “we are all textualists now”31 — to
be an overstatement.
At the other end of the spectrum, however, there were no extreme
purposivists either, in the sense of the purposivism that has been textualism’s foil. No judge stated that purpose was a more important tool
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
29 See Gluck, supra note 19, at 1907–18; Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory
Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013).
30 It is for this reason that we offer examples in many of our questions. For instance, when we
asked judges if they use canons, we defined some canons for them. We recognize this method of
questioning may bring some criticism of leading, but we selected this manner of questioning to
create an atmosphere of respect and trust, which in turn encouraged an open discussion.
31 Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV.
1023, 1057 (1998); see Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 117, 133 (2009); Kagan, supra note 1.
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than statutory text, and only one judge claimed to begin analysis of a
statutory case with the statute’s purpose. Even those judges who emphasized the importance of purpose as an interpretive tool made clear
they still would not use purpose to push a statute’s interpretation beyond
the limits of its text.
And when it comes to tools of decision, the biggest divisions among
the judges interviewed had nothing to do with text, legislative history,
or canons — the topics that dominate and divide Supreme Court opinions and academic discourse. Also, no significant differences could be
found simply by looking at the political party of the President who had
appointed the judge, or at other personal factors such as the judge’s
gender or race, at least based on our limited sample. Among the judges
we interviewed, the greatest divisions resulted from the three factors
that we already have introduced and now further detail: the judge’s age,
whether he or she sits on the D.C. Circuit, and prior experience working
on Capitol Hill. These factors have received almost no theoretical
attention.
1. The Judge’s Generation. — The judges over the age of seventy,
regardless of political affiliation, were much more focused on questions
about the inherent power and duty of the federal courts in statutory
cases than on any interpretive dogmas. Above we called these judges
the “legal process institutionalists.” They were more forthright about
the quasi-legislative activity that statutory interpretation by judges entails, and discussed openly whether gaps in statutes could be understood
as delegation by Congress to the courts. This position gels with Posner’s
work, which has emphasized that statutory interpretation, in reality, often entails more than merely searching for original meaning. Posner
identifies two additional general categories of statutory interpretation:
giving meaning to “unexpressed intent” and “giving a fresh meaning to
a statement” by “making old law satisfy modern needs and understandings.”32 In such situations, the judge’s function is, realistically, more
legislative than interpretive. Many of the older judges recognized this,
especially with regard to unexpressed intent (we encountered more resistance to the idea of updating, as detailed in Part V).
The younger judges, on the other hand, many of whom went to law
school in the 1980s or later, advanced a more rule-oriented approach.
These are who we call the “canonists.” Most of them, as noted, are very
familiar with the canons of construction, either through their legal education or their litigation and advocacy experience — and have them at
the forefront of their thinking. They do not seem to focus on the bigpicture questions about the judicial role and inherent authority that we
heard emphasized by the older judges — indeed, they seem more insecure than the older judges that they even have such authority. This is
not a division that tracks the political party of the nominating President.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
32

Hively, 853 F.3d at 352 (Posner, J., concurring).
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Instead, the general influence of formalism on this generation of judges
seems to carry across the board. We heard Justice Scalia’s and textualism’s influences emphasized by younger judges of all political backgrounds. As one liberal judge told us:
I use [the canons]. I feel obliged to use them. I try to think about what it
means and these things are popping into my mind. If I had been educated
differently maybe other things would pop into my mind. I can’t help it.

Another said:
I’m in the post-Scalia world and very much grew up in that, so the first
thing I do is look to the immediate text and then I zoom out and look at the
sections and see where it fits into the context. Then . . . I’ll look to where
that section is cross-referenced in the statute, or if the same term is being
used in other sections or surrounding provisions . . . . I think about
Congress’s goals in a given statute, but more through the canons of construction. . . . In terms of legislative history . . . I don’t rule it out, but I’m
the poster child for how statutory interpretation has developed over time,
Scalia’s impact, because in opinions I do write things, only at the very end,
like “we need not rely on it but to the extent there is any doubt it is put to
rest by the committee report.” Always with that proviso.

Trends in legal education, including the new courses in statutory interpretation that tend to highlight the influence of textualism on the
field,33 alongside the virtual disappearance of legal process theory from
most American law school curricula,34 are likely playing an important
role in this generational shift.
There are of course differences within the groups, some of which
come from intersections with other themes that emerged from our study.
For instance, the younger judges with Capitol Hill experience were more
critical of some of the canons than other judges of the same generation,
especially when the canons adopt an unrealistic view of the legislative
process.
2. The D.C. Circuit Is Different. — A second major theme that
emerges is that the D.C. Circuit judges appear different from the others.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
33 See Gluck, supra note 2, at 157 (finding the courses focus on canons and debates over legislative history).
34 Cf. Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the
Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2122–26 (2003); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV.
691, 694 (1987) (“Scholars have significantly expanded the agenda for legislation by reconceptualizing legal doctrine through models and insights from other academic disciplines and by criticizing
the ideological assumptions of the Hart & Sacks approach.”); id. at 693 (“Today, alternative philosophies of law . . . challenge the legal process consensus.”); Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen,
Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1828–
29 (2016) (“Today’s leading public law theories depart from the old legal process in acknowledging
the normativity of legal decisionmaking and accepting that ‘no issues are simply “procedural.”’”
(quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a
Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 762 (1991) (emphasis added))).
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They have drunk the Chevron Kool-Aid — the decisionmaking framework that requires judges to defer to reasonable agency interpretations
of ambiguous statutes.35 They find comfort in that framework and consider the question of the agency’s role to be the first and most important
question in statutory cases. In contrast, the vast majority of the non–
D.C. Circuit judges we spoke with seriously questioned the wisdom and
even legality of Chevron, especially in regard to legal questions that are
not within an agency’s expertise. We elaborate on our Chevron-related
findings in Part VII.
3. Previous Experience Working in the Federal Government. — Previous experience working in the legislative or executive branch of the
federal government, or even a state government, appears to have a significant impact on a judge’s approach to statutory interpretation, at
least in our sample. We found that judges with previous Capitol Hill
experience are less likely to embrace many of the interpretive assumptions favored by the current Supreme Court that depend on the fiction
that Congress is perfect, consistent, and omniscient.
Indeed, these “ex-staffer” judges are more likely to accept a broader
judicial role, taking the view that no statutory drafter can ever foresee
and encompass the full range of possible statutory applications. These
judges — again regardless of political affiliation — were more interested
in legislative history, understanding how Congress works, giving
Congress the benefit of the doubt, and even repairing Congress’s mistakes. For these reasons, unlike conventional textualists, many of these
judges — even those who are publicly associated with a text-centric approach — did not put much of a premium on reading statutes to be consistent, internally coherent, nonredundant, and so on — the kinds of
canons that are most favored by the Scalia/Garner treatise36 but that
bear little resemblance to how Congress actually drafts.
C. An Overarching Impression of Widespread Eclecticism
Our overarching impression across all of the categories of judges was
one of widespread eclecticism. For some judges, the eclecticism seemed
intentional, as a way to make the judge confident of having reached the
“correct result.” One judge, known widely as a textualist, put it this
way: “I just keep reading until I get comfortable. If I have to start
reading a secondary text . . . I will. I don’t necessarily rely on everything I have read but I do keep reading.” Others said that looking at all
the materials is about ensuring “[we] are doing what the legislature
wanted” and “to the extent judges believe it is their job to find out what
Congress meant, being eclectic is inevitable.” Another said: “Nobody
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
35
36

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984).
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 167–68, 170.
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endorses any other method! That’s like asking me why I look at a map
to get where I am going. It’s the only way that makes any sense.” We
found these perspectives interesting and not well represented in most
current scholarship about statutory interpretation.37
Some judges did seem more at sea. For these, a preference for eclecticism seems to stem from an eagerness to grasp at whatever supports
are available to reinforce a conclusion and to help to explain decisions
in ways that are both acceptable to colleagues of different political persuasions, and that also sound sufficiently “opinion-like” for the general
public. Indeed, we heard a lot about statutory interpretation doctrine
as a way to express results in opinions, rather than as a tool that actually
decides cases.
One judge put it especially colorfully:
My perception is that judges are eclectic in their approaches to statutory
interpretation for two principal reasons. They want to use as many tools as
possible to guide their way to a ruling and to test the results of one interpretive aid against those of another; or they want no more than to find
fellow travelers to support the desired result that their “priors” (to use Dick
[Posner]’s word) lead them, much as a drunk uses a lamppost more for support than illumination. . . . [I]t is prudent, I believe to employ the various
checks and cross-checks noted above. . . . Why? We need as much help as
we can get.

Another judge defended the eclecticism we saw on the ground this
way: “That is the essence of being a judge.” He said: “You could give
someone a computer and they could do our job, you could feed in all the
canons, rules, etc., and it could spit out an opinion. But the essence of
being a judge is the human factor.”
Only a few judges articulated any general theory of their own interpretive approach. Most resisted the very question — that is, resisted
the idea that their practice is driven by any organized theory. Instead
they told us they move case by case, in almost a common law fashion.
Although eclecticism may not seem a particularly exciting finding,
our findings may dispel some misconceptions about judging in statutory
cases and may also help shift the intellectual debate to newer and more
fruitful topics than the now very tired “textualism versus purposivism”
debate. We think it more interesting to focus on such questions as why
the canons endure and why judges are uncomfortable writing opinions
without them even if they do not really use them in decisionmaking. We
also find more interesting questions concerning how judges think about
who (Congress? The Supreme Court?) can control their own interpretive
approach; what they think their role is in helping Congress, such as correcting its mistakes; and how judges should relate to agencies that issue
judicially reviewable decisions.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
37 For a notable and early exception, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
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We can acknowledge that judges use a mixture of interpretive tools
and then finally move past the evidentiary issue to questions like why
they write opinions the way they do, and whether it undermines legitimacy that many judges do not seem to have a consistent or identifiable
interpretive approach. To the extent that appellate judges are doing
more common law–type judging in the statutory context than previously
assumed, pragmatism may be playing a bigger role than most judges
(Posner excluded) have previously publicly acknowledged.
As noted, in reviewing a random sample of each judge’s opinions,
we confirmed that all the judges we interviewed cited both canons and
legislative history, and generally used the wide range of materials they
described. Most, though not all, of the judges we interviewed rely on
the parties’ briefs at least some of the time to “tee up” the relevant evidentiary tools in the case. For instance, the choice among which of the
many potential canons that could be cited in opinions largely comes in
response to a party’s own argument. But the judges themselves — or
at least their law clerks drafting opinions — also are sometimes responsible for introducing canons or legislative history into an opinion.
In the next Parts, we aggregate the judges’ responses across the array
of topics we raised with them. At the end of the paper, to provide a
more holistic picture of judicial approaches to statutory interpretation,
we provide excerpts from interviews of judges of different “types” (redacted where necessary to preserve confidentiality).
III. DO JUDGES REALLY READ THE (WHOLE) STATUTE
AT THE OUTSET OF STATUTORY CASES?
Textualists often state that they look only to the text when beginning
a statutory interpretation inquiry. We have reason to doubt that this is
what most judges do — especially those who claim one should read the
entire statute — given the length and complexity of many modern statutes. Statutes are not narrative documents; their density and numerous
cross-references make most statutes impossible even for most legislative
experts to read cover to cover. Why do so many courts and theorists
adopt the fiction that judges do this? We wondered whether, in practice,
judges prefer to have some context about what the fight is over — for
instance, by reading a bench memo, or a brief — before delving into a
statutory text. Even judges who say they do not seek out statutory purpose or legislative history might still be exposed to this information, perhaps before seeing the statute’s text, if they read briefs and lower court
opinions before turning to the statute. We also wondered whether
judges use dictionaries, which are often the first interpretive tools looked
to by the current Court after plain text.
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A. Text Versus Context
Twenty-four of the judges we interviewed reported that they begin
statutory interpretation with the words of the statute. But there was
disagreement as to what that meant. For two of the judges, reading the
statute is a pro forma exercise, apparently for “cover” in opinion writing.
Both told us that they begin with the text “because the Supreme Court
has told us many times we have to,” but both then move quickly to other
considerations, including purpose and consequences.
Three of the judges told us they begin by reading the entire statute,
not just the contested provisions — which, as noted, we doubt is often
possible. But these were not Scalia-style textualists. Two of these textcentrics told us they also look to legislative history if the statute is unclear, and one told us that he looks at statutory language to determine
whether there is “an inherent delegation” of gap-filling power to courts.
One of them will not consult a dictionary — the tool popularized by the
textualists but now deployed by virtually the entire Supreme Court38 —
at all.
The remaining nineteen of the twenty-four judges who report beginning with text told us they begin with the words of the provision at issue
but expand consideration if the statute is vague to include precedent,
the evolution of the statute, and legislative history. Nine of these judges
were appointed by a Republican President.
Thirteen other judges — six appointed by Republican Presidents and
several of whom are publicly associated with a textualist approach —
told us that they do not start with the words at all, but instead begin
with some combination of the briefs and the lower court opinion. They
told us they do this to “understand what the issue in the case is,” “to
understand the problem.” Some alluded to the awkwardness of admitting they do not start with the text, as if that is what the public expects
judges to do.
These statements were consistent with our view that a recalibration
of what we expect from judges when it comes to reading massive modern statutes may be in order. Judges should not have to apologize for
beginning their inquiry into statutory questions somewhere other than
the statutory text — especially in the case of statutes that are excessively
lengthy, complex, or replete with cross-references and so impossible to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
38 See James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for
Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 494–502 (2013);
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The United States
Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 84–93
(2010) [hereinafter Kirchmeier & Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress]; Samuel A. Thumma &
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use
of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 256–60 (1999) [hereinafter Kirchmeier & Thumma, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress].
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read sequentially. (Indeed, as the Gluck-Bressman study found, even
expert congressional staffers rarely start with the text for precisely this
reason.39) As one judge told us:
I certainly begin with the text of the statute. That’s not even true. I actually
begin with the parties’ briefs. Then I drag out the text of the statute. I already
have some grounding from the briefs in the competing interpretations . . . .

Another said:
No idea. I read the brief. I read whatever it is the law clerks have prepared
for me . . . it all starts to form an impression. At some point I read the entire
statute. I could say I begin with the statute but that’s not quite correct.

In the end, both the judges who start with the words of the statute
and those who do not seem to us to engage in essentially the same mode
of contextual analysis, which defies categorization as either textualist or
purposivist. They begin by trying to understand the statute, the problem the statute addresses, and the issue in the case at a broad level of
generality. This broad lens often seems necessary to understand what
lengthy and complex modern statutes mean. None of the judges we
spoke with was formalist about this process.
There are five more judges whom we have not aggregated above.
That is because they sit on the D.C. Circuit and told us that their first
question is always Chevron. We elaborate on this special feature of the
D.C. Circuit below.
B. Dictionaries
Of the forty-two judges whom we interviewed, only seventeen advocated using dictionaries, even though dictionaries are a favored interpretive tool of the current Supreme Court.40 The others told us that
they rarely consulted dictionaries, or preferred to consult them in two
types of circumstances: (1) to ascertain technical or specialized meaning;
or (2) to determine if a word has multiple meanings, which they might
do by consulting several dictionaries. We asked about the use of dictionaries after we asked the judges where they begin their analysis in
statutory cases and the role that “plain meaning” plays in their decisions,
because dictionaries are often trotted out by the Court to substantiate a
textual reading before moving on to canons or nontextual tools. Although textualists may be responsible for elevating the importance of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 7, at 972–73 (noting many staffers begin instead with
the more narrative “section-by-section” summary, id. at 972).
40 See Brudney & Baum, supra note 38, at 495 (finding that the Supreme Court relied on dictionaries to define terms in 145 opinions from 1800 to 1969; in 89 opinions from 1969 to 1986; in
373 opinions during the nineteen-year Rehnquist era; and in 138 opinions during the first five terms
of the Roberts Court); Kirchmeier & Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress, supra note 38, at 79
(finding that during the Supreme Court Terms from 2000 through 2009, the Justices referenced
dictionary definitions to define almost 300 words or phrases).
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dictionaries, the Court’s liberals now use dictionaries almost as often as
the Court’s conservatives. As Professors James Brudney and Lawrence
Baum have documented, in a subset of cases likely to require statutory
interpretation between 2005 and 2010 Chief Justice Roberts cited a dictionary in 35.7% of majority opinions; Justice Scalia in 30.8%; Justice
Kennedy in 23.1%; Justice Thomas in 35.7%; Justice Ginsburg in 23.5%;
Justice Breyer in 28.0%; Justice Alito in 33.3%; Justice Sotomayor in
25.0%; and Justice Kagan in 50.0%.41
Yet dictionaries strike us as an odd interpretive tool. As the GluckBressman study found, congressional drafters do not consult dictionaries
when drafting.42 Dictionaries are “extrinsic” interpretive aids — aids
outside of the statutory text — much as legislative history is, but dictionaries have not received the same critical scrutiny. Scholars have long
pointed out that dictionaries tend to lag behind the real-life evolution of
language.43 Indeed, a judge today who wishes to determine ordinary
usage might be better off consulting Google. And as one of our respondents told us, if usage is truly ordinary, the judge does not need a dictionary to discover it.
A recent study catalogues the statutory terms for which the Court
has consulted a dictionary in recent years.44 The terms include some
very ordinary words, including “any,” “also,” “upon,” and “shall.”45 In
our view, there is a difference between looking up arcane legal terminology or technical terms, like medical terms in a specialized dictionary,
and looking up words like “shall” and “any.” If a statute creates sufficient ambiguity that the judge doubts that by “any” or “shall” Congress
really means “any” or “shall,” looking those terms up in a dictionary is
not going to solve the problem. That judge will have to resort to context.
A number of the judges we interviewed made similar comments and
told us they generally eschew dictionaries but find utility in them only
for specialized, technical, or medical terms. Several judges told us they
consult multiple dictionaries, and do not find dictionaries useful if they
conflict.
In our random sampling, we were able to confirm for all but two of
the judges that those who expressed skepticism about dictionaries were
cautious about using them in opinions. Four of the judges who expressed skepticism never appeared to use them at all. Dictionaries,
when used by these judges, were used with caution, much less frequently
than other interpretive tools, and not for simple, everyday words like
“any.” As noted in Part I, we also examined all of the statutory inter
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
41
42
43

Brudney & Baum, supra note 38, at 522.
See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 7, at 938.
See Brudney & Baum, supra note 38, at 502; Kirchmeier & Thumma, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress, supra note 38, at 243, 294.
44 Kirchmeier & Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress, supra note 38.
45 Id. app. at 135, 172, 177.
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pretation majority opinions for twenty-one of the judges, randomly selected. Setting aside one recently appointed circuit judge without a long
record of decisions, the four heaviest dictionary users relied on dictionaries in between 29 to 32% of statutory interpretation cases. The median judge relied on dictionaries in about 10% of cases. On the low end,
six of the judges relied on dictionaries in 5% or less of cases, and two of
the judges never relied on dictionaries. In all but the same two cases
noted above, the judges who told us they used dictionaries frequently or
infrequently adopted that approach in their opinions. Our assessment
of all of these cases also confirmed the judges’ claims that they rarely
used dictionaries for everyday words. Across our sample, the judges
used dictionaries for everyday words in less than 0.5% of statutory interpretation cases.
We also were able to confirm from the opinions what judges told us
they did with respect to consulting multiple dictionaries: they do so to
determine if a word has a settled meaning and then do not rely on dictionaries if their definitions conflict. Finally, and perhaps not surprisingly, most of the judges whom we earlier called “canonists” — younger
judges educated and having practiced during the rise of textualism —
were more forthright about consulting dictionaries both in their interviews with us and in their opinions. Even these judges, however, rarely
used dictionaries to consult everyday words.
One judge may have captured it best when he said that dictionaries
are useful only for “lamp-post citations” — they illuminate a point that
is already in the statute. Another judge said:
Every now and then you refer to a dictionary in writing an opinion, but
I’ve never relied on one in deciding an opinion. What gets written in the
opinion is sort of a stylized version of my messier, more holistic thought
process. . . . I’m not trying to evade the law in what I do, but the procession
in my head is much messier than what I write.

C. The Chevron Judges: The D.C. Circuit Begins
in a Different Place from Everyone Else
All but one of our six respondents on the D.C. Circuit made clear
that Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.46 — the case in which the Court declared that reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes should receive deference from
courts47 — defines their interpretive approach more than anything else.
The first thing these judges think about is not what the fight is about,
or what the statute is meant to do, or what the statute says, but simply
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
46
47

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (narrowing the application of
Chevron deference to only those circumstances in which “it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”).
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whether the statute invites an agency interpretation and whether the
statute is ambiguous. Administrative law cases implicating these questions dominate the D.C. Circuit docket.
One judge told us that the first thing he does is to see whether the
meaning of the statute is clear without interpretive aids because so finding would take him out of Chevron. Another emphasized that “the word
ambiguous is a magic word in my court. It means the agency. That
obviously puts pressure on the concept of what is ambiguous.”
The dominance of the Chevron inquiry also makes D.C. Circuit
judges less interpretively pluralistic. In response to our follow-up question on the defensibility of interpretive eclecticism, one D.C. Circuit
judge said:
Judges on this court might be different from other judges because so much
of our work relates to Chevron. Most cases we have on statutory interpretation if the statute is ambiguous we don’t have to go further. For us, when
we are reviewing statutes de novo, like in the criminal context, it’s a completely different thing, in terms of your list of eclectic considerations. . . .
But most of the time we are looking at it through the Chevron lens.

In contrast, many of the non–D.C. Circuit judges told us they did
not have too much experience with Chevron cases, or had little faith in
the concept of agency deference. This difference across circuit practice
is important. The decisionmaking process in a Chevron case is not the
same as in a non-Chevron statutory interpretation case. As one (non–
D.C. Circuit) judge aptly put it:
In the practice of Chevron, all issues come through the lens of ambiguity. If
a question comes though the district court and you are without an agency,
in your mind you can skip over all the anxiety about whether it is clear or
not and you just come to the right conclusion. You think about the whole
problem differently.

Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit recently published an essay in
which he agreed with the proposition that using the existence of ambiguity as a starting place may distort the inquiry:
[B]ecause it is so difficult to make those clarity versus ambiguity determinations in a coherent, evenhanded way, courts should reduce the number of
canons of construction that depend on an initial finding of ambiguity. Instead, courts should seek the best reading of the statute . . . .48

There may be a generalizable point to make here about specialized
courts. Academics have long been interested in whether specialized
courts approach statutory questions differently from generalized courts.
The D.C. Circuit acts essentially as a specialized court when it comes to
administrative law, and our findings support the conclusion that it is not
looking at cases in the same way as other appellate courts.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
48 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2121 (2016)
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
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Figure 1: Where Judges Begin in Statutory Cases
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IV. EXTRINSIC SOURCES: PURPOSE,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND CANONS
The next series of questions inquired about the common extrinsic
tools of statutory interpretation — legislative history, statutory purpose,
and the canons of construction. The choice among these tools is the
most frequently expressed reason for divisions in statutory Supreme
Court cases.49 The way judges choose among these tools has also been
the general method by which academics, and some judges as well, have
categorized judges.50
As noted, “purposivists” are said to rely on legislative purposes and,
often, legislative history. Although purposivism was once a dominant
approach, textualists have been quite effective at pejoratively casting
the use of purpose — especially when used to fill out or go beyond statutory text — as activist, even though there is little evidence that
purpose-oriented judges are in fact more activist.51 By contrast, “textual
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
49 See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 967–68, 971–77 (2016) (majority and dissent disputing applicability of different grammatical canons, as well as legislative history and lenity); Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2272 n.10, 2281–82 (2014) (majority and dissent
disputing whether lenity canon triggered); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088–91, 2094–
97 (2014) (majority and concurrence disputing whether federalism canon triggered); United States
v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 428–29, 434–35 (2009) (majority and dissent disagreeing on whether legislative history displaces need for canons); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or.,
515 U.S. 687, 697–708, 715–25 (1995) (majority and dissent each relying on series of different textual
tools for preferred construction).
50 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 2, at 447–599 (differentiating among judges’ approaches based on these tools).
51 See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117 (2008)
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ists” are said to prefer plain language and canons of construction, a point
highlighted by the recent Scalia/Garner treatise on the canons, which
lists fifty-seven “Sound Principles of Interpretation”52 and thirteen canons that the authors call “Falsities Exposed.”53 Even putting aside the
Scalia/Garner work, canons are back at the forefront of academic attention, including our own. Gluck’s work has pressed the question of where
the canons come from (who creates them and therefore who can change
them), what justifies their usage, and what role they really play in deciding cases.54
A. Judges Did Not Wish to Label Themselves
as Either Textualists or Purposivists
We saw much more agreement about the general approach than disagreement, and more emphasis on context and pragmatics than either
plain text or purpose. Some of the most illuminating answers in this
regard came to our question, asked toward the end of the survey,
whether there was a “single word” to describe the judges’ interpretive
approach. We offered the descriptive terms “textualist,” “purposivist,”
“pragmatist,” “contextualist,” or “anything else” as options they might
choose. We provide these responses here to set the stage for the more
detailed findings that follow.
Not one judge was willing to describe him or herself as a textualist
without qualification. Every judge who included textualist in his or her
self-description qualified the description in ways along the following
lines: “some word that is on the continuum between textualist and contextualist”; “pragmatist but constraining”; “closer to textualist but not
unmindful of practical consequences”; “textualist, but I would include
being a contextualist”; or “textual pragmatism.”
At the other extreme, only two judges out of the forty-two characterized themselves as “purposivist” without qualification (one appointed by
each of the two political parties). Only four additional judges mentioned
purpose at all, but with qualifications that they are both textualist and
purposivist, or contextualist and purposivist. Three judges refused to
answer this question, saying no single word or phrase could capture
their approach.55
The figure below provides a snapshot of how judges self-described,
along a continuum of textualism, to contextualism, to purposivism, to
pragmatism and Chevron-oriented.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(reporting that reliance on legislative history tends to constrain liberal justices’ readings of statutes
in employment and labor cases).
52 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 47; see id. at 53–339 (analyzing each of these principles in turn).
53 Id. at 341; see id. at 343–410 (analyzing each of these falsities in turn).
54 Gluck, supra note 29, at 760–70; see also, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and
Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109 (2010).
55 One judge was not asked this question.
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Figure 2: How Judges Describe Their Approach
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“Narrow.”
“In general I’m a textualist but as Nino [Scalia] has said on occasion,
‘I’m not a nut.’”
“Textualist. I would include being a contextualist.”
“I don’t think there is any difference between textualist and contextualist; if there was it’s eroded. I think that all good textualists are
contextualists.”
“Contextualist.” (four judges)
“I would describe myself as closer to textualist but not unmindful of
practical consequences.”
“Some word that is on the continuum between textualist and contextualist, pragmatist but constraining.”
“I don’t have a single legal philosophy. . . . I am not a textualist. But
I don’t have anything with a label. I’m not so purposivist to abandon text. If they didn’t achieve their purpose then they did a lousy
job drafting. Too bad.”
“I’m probably more of a textualist than you are [referencing Posner].
I would add sensible as another word.”
“Combination of textualist and pragmatist.”
“Textualist, contextualist, and purposivist.”
“Contextualist/purposivist.” (two judges)
“Quasi-contextualist.”
“Holistic.” (two judges)
“Diligent and thorough. I’m certainly not absolutist.”
“To the extent any of those words reject purposivism it doesn’t seem
right. All of those words seem to capture an important part of it but
I am reluctant to pick one of those terms at exclusion of others.”
“If textualism means I wouldn’t look beyond text or dictionary, then
no. If purposivist means purpose above all else, then no. If pragmatist means look at all the tools you have before you, then yes.”
“Purposivist.”
“Purposive.”
“Purpose with variety.”
“Contextualist-pragmatist.”
“Contextualist and pragmatic.”
“Flexible-sensible.”
“Sensible and just.”
“Pragmatist.” (two judges)
“Realist.” (two judges)
“Common sense.”
“Searching for truth.”
“Standard of review and precedent”
“Begin with Chevron and precedent, then move to plain meaning,
then purpose, context and structure.”
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These findings should bolster our effort to open the door to new debates in statutory interpretation because they give rise to new questions.
What does it mean to be “contextualist”? Some prominent academic
textualists have used the contextual label, but their reference to context
often means only canons, statutory structure and surrounding words.56
Our judges took a much broader view. Pragmatism was also an important theme. Is pragmatism in statutory interpretation consistent with
legislative supremacy or the role of the courts in a democracy? Are there
legal doctrines that could guide interpretive pragmatism? These kinds
of questions have not received the attention they deserve.
B. Widespread Use of Legislative History
Every judge we spoke with, except for one, told us he or she uses
legislative history. Recognizing that we do not have a representative
sample of judges, one of the most salient findings of our study is that
the most common way of categorizing different judicial approaches —
through a judge’s choice of interpretive rules and materials57 — is not a
feasible sorting technique in the lower courts because it appears that
many judges use all the available tools.
Most judges took a moderate approach to all of this material, and
this may indeed be due to Justice Scalia’s impact. For instance, judges
publicly regarded as “liberal” emphasized using legislative history only
in moderation, or told us that they now use it much less than they had
before. As one judge put it:
I’ve kind of joined my conservative colleagues on legislative history. It has
to be really reflective of what Congress thought and that wasn’t my view
earlier. I think I did get convinced by my colleagues that were hostile to it.
I will use it if it’s serious.

And on the other side, Justice Scalia’s extreme position on legislative
history was rejected by the most conservative judges on our list — including all who described themselves as the most text-centric. Instead,
they all consult legislative history. Several conservative judges told us
that Justice Scalia’s 100% exclusionary rule for legislative history went
too far, and made comments on the order of: “I’ll look at almost anything
in that — committee reports, floor statements — I’m skeptical, but I
most certainly will look at it”; and “Yes definitely [I use legislative history]. Discerning what the legislature meant is very hard. Today fewer
judges are purposivist in the Learned Hand sense. Today we have a
much smaller playing field where text is really the most important to
everyone.” One noted conservative judge said:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
56 See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70,
92–93 (2006) (“Textualists start with contextual evidence that goes to customary usage and habits
of speech . . . . When contextual evidence of semantic usage points decisively in one direction, that
evidence takes priority over contextual evidence that relates to questions of policy.”).
57 See supra p. 1321.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3138249

2018]

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ON THE BENCH

1325

I argued with Nino [Scalia] for years about legislative history. I thought he
took an extreme position. I agree to look at legislative history only if you
can’t discern the meaning in statutes without it. . . . I don’t have the same
discomfort looking at committee reports, in particular the conference report,
particularly if the statute was ambiguous.

Another: “The pendulum has swung too far against legislative history. Committee reports have value.”
One judge explained frankly what most of us already know — even
judges who may not seek out legislative history are always exposed to it
through briefing materials, so it necessarily helps form an impression:
Here is where the real world departs from the theoretical world. The bench
memo will have looked at the statute. Many times it will have looked at
the legislative history even if the statute isn’t particularly vague. It’s kind
of a due diligence the clerk does to prepare a judge. The suggestion that
you follow some kind of methodological rule in terms of looking at legislative history tends to be overly formalist and not in the real world.

Our limited research into the opinions of the judges we interviewed
confirmed that all indeed have consulted legislative history. As noted in
Part I, we also randomly selected twenty-one of the judges and surveyed
all of their references to legislative history in majority opinions. The
median judge in that sample relied on legislative history in 32% of cases.
Three of the judges relied on legislative history in more than half of
statutory interpretation cases, ten in more than a third of cases, and
seventeen in more than a fifth of cases.
The judges’ responses to our questions also are consistent with a
recent study by Brudney and Baum that looked at statutory interpretation cases across three subject matter areas in three circuits.58 That
study likewise found far less disagreement among appellate judges than
we see on the Supreme Court on the topic of legislative history.59 An
interesting side note: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice
Gorsuch all used legislative history when they were on the Courts of
Appeals.60
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
58
59
60

Brudney & Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 20.
Id. at 717–19.
See Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 790 F.3d 1088, 1096 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.) (noting
that “[a] study of the Act’s history yields still more evidence [for the court’s holding]”); Almond v.
Unified Sch. Dist. # 501, 665 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J.) (recognizing that
“[b]eyond language of [the statute] itself, [and] beyond its statutory references and history, lies the
realm of legislative history,” which may “serve to corroborate” textual analysis); United States v.
Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 947 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]he legislative history in
this case is neither murky, ambiguous, nor contradictory.”), abrogated by Reynolds v. United States,
565 U.S. 432 (2012); Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.) (noting that
notwithstanding “superficially clear” statutory language, legislative history may be used to “shed
new light on congressional intent” (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir.
2000))); Consumer Elecs. Ass’n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J.) (noting “that
we ‘may examine the statute’s legislative history in order to shed new light on congressional intent,
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Our findings support our view that the legislative history debate,
including the idea that the use of legislative history is a litmus test for
what statutory interpretation philosophy one adopts, is no longer interesting nor truly relevant and should be put to rest. We also disagree
with academics who have argued that the shift in focus should be to
which legislative history judges should use.61 This debate is also no
debate. None of our judges told us that he or she uses legislative history
indiscriminately. Each one emphasized an informal hierarchy of legislative materials, with committee and conference reports generally at the
top, as most congressional experts recommend.62 Indeed, perhaps due
to the effect of developments in legal education on the younger cohort
of judges, one such judge told us: “Legislative history, it’s another thing
for better or worse that I have been instructed about. I have been instructed floor statements are weaker and committee reports and congressional conference reports are strongest.”
This is not to say that judges always get it right. The GluckBressman empirical study of the legislative process found certain kinds
of legislative history — for instance, committee markups and consensus,
bipartisan history — particularly valuable.63 It did not seem to us that
the judges we spoke with were making determinations of reliability at
that level of specificity. But they seemed receptive to being educated
about which materials were more reliable and relevant to any particular
case. We think this is an important role to be played by lawyers in the
briefings.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
notwithstanding statutory language that appears superficially clear’” (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 216
F.3d at 127)); id. at 297 (“To determine whether Congress has . . . spoken [to the precise question at
issue], we apply ‘traditional tools of statutory interpretation — text, structure, purpose, and legislative history.’” (quoting Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 224 (D.C.
Cir. 2001))); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 319 (2005) (statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“I have, though, as a judge, relied on legislative history to help
clarify ambiguity in the text. . . . I have quoted and looked to legislative history in the past to help
determine the meaning of ambiguous terms, and I would expect to follow that same approach on
the Supreme Court.”); Elliot M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 983–85, 992–93 (2007) (claiming that Justice Alito
consulted legislative history to establish the appropriate context in which to read statutory text
usually when the statute’s language was not dispositive, but also occasionally when it was
unambiguous).
61 See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 76–77 (2012) (offering rules for deciding which legislative
history to use); see also James J. Brudney, Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage
by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 63 (2007) (advocating a
move away from debate about exclusion of legislative history and instead to one about its relative
weight).
62 See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 61, at 98.
63 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 7, at 978, 986–88.
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C. Almost All Judges Invoked Purpose
Purpose seems to be another straw man, relevant only to academic
(and perhaps artificial) divisions in the Court. Only four of the fortytwo judges we spoke with did not mention purpose as an appropriate
tool of statutory interpretation.64 The judges we spoke with interpreted
the search for purpose in terms of “the mischief” or “the problem that
gave rise to the statute in the first place.” One described it as follows:
“What are they trying to accomplish? Absolutely I use it.”
No judge advocated the so-called sin of the Holy Trinity (referring
to the infamous and much-maligned 1892 decision that first sanctioned
using a statute’s “spirit” to trump clear text).65 Holy Trinity has long
been used as a foil by textualists to argue that textualism offers a more
objective approach. But the judges with whom we spoke use purpose
as part of the background context, together with other evidence, including text.
D. Canons of Construction
The canons of statutory construction, like the use of legislative history, have been held out as a type of judicial-philosophy litmus test. To
the extent that the field of legislation has “doctrines,” they are the canons.66 The canons include presumptions about language use (for instance, the presumption that terms are used consistently throughout
statutes, or the presumption that Congress does not use repetitive language) and presumptions about policy (for instance, the presumption
that federal statutes do not preempt state law unless they clearly so state,
or the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes67).
Some canons, like the rule of lenity, date back centuries.68 Others, like
the federalism canon, are creations of the modern Court.69 Together
with textual arguments and legislative history, the canons comprise the
basic advocacy toolkit for statutory cases. These presumptions are the
subject of an increasing number of law school courses as well as of the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
64
65

One judge was not asked the question.
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar rule,
that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”). This is the case most reviled by textualists for
its purpose-over-text approach. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 116
(2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to Holy Trinity as “that miraculous redeemer of lost causes”).
66 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 2, at 447 (calling the canons the “doctrines of statutory
interpretation”).
67 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
68 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2567 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“This rule of construction — better known today as the rule of lenity — first emerged
in 16th-century England . . . .”).
69 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991).
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Scalia/Garner treatise.70 As one judge put it: “[T]hese are typically in
the arguments advanced by counsel on one side or other, so that certainly brings me to take them into account . . . Scalia and Garner’s book
cites sixty-plus of them. [Professor] Eskridge provided a list too.”71
It is sometimes assumed that purposivist judges use legislative history, while textualist judges use canons. That assumption should be put
to rest. All of our forty-two judges use both tools to some extent and
there does not seem to be any link between their canon use and the
political party of their nominating Presidents, or their denominations as
conservative or liberal.
This is not to say that the canons are treated as “law,” as ordinary
doctrine is, or that their legal status is even fully understood.72 The
Court itself has called them mere “rules of thumb.”73 Judges across the
board generally do not give the canons precedential effect. And yet, the
canons dominate briefing in cases raising statutory interpretation questions and are typically referenced in opinions to justify statutory interpretation decisions. A random sampling of opinions from each of the
forty-two judges we interviewed revealed all of the judges to use canons
routinely, despite some telling us that they do not.
At least since Professor Karl Llewellyn’s famous exposition in 1950,74
canons have always been part of the intellectual debate over statutory
interpretation. Are there too many? Are they simply tools for post-hoc
justification of what is really result-oriented judging? In addition to
these questions, which have been percolating for some time, in recent
years academics have raised new jurisprudential questions about the
canons. These new questions include inquiries about the canons’
sources — that is, where do they come from (judges? Congress? the Constitution?) — and, relatedly, about who can alter them.75 Such inquiries
are important, because they relate to the judicial lawmaking power in
the statutory era and also the extent of Congress’s authority over the
interpretive methods judges use.
Another set of inquiries goes to the canons’ purpose and whether
they are fulfilling that purpose. For instance, if the canons are supposed
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
70
71

See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13; Gluck, supra note 2, at 157.
For the Eskridge appendices listing the canons, see ESKRIDGE, GLUCK & NOURSE, supra
note 2, app. 6, at 1091–114; and William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court,
1993 Term — Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 app. at 97–108 (1994).
72 See Gluck, supra note 19, at 1909–18 (detailing the ambiguous legal status of federal statutory
interpretation methodology).
73 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
74 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950) (showing that for
every canon there is a counter-canon).
75 See generally Barrett, supra note 54; Gluck, supra note 29; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002).
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to be presumptions that Congress knows or shares, as courts often
claim,76 it seems important to verify them as such. If, alternatively,
canons aim to affect how Congress drafts, as courts claim also — for
instance, making Congress draft with more precise language or with
certain policy norms in mind77 — then it would be important to confirm
that they do actually serve those purposes. If canons aim simply to
reflect congressional drafting practice,78 likewise it matters if they actually do. Gluck’s empirical work calls all of these sets of assumptions
into doubt.79 And if canons are instead policy norms that judges apply
atop Congress’s work product, then we should press for reasons why
judges think that this kind of quasi-legislating is legitimate, and determine whether they even acknowledge it as such.
Even though the judges we interviewed certainly use canons, their
reasons for doing so did not approach anything close to this level of
analysis. The notion that the canons may need a connection to how
statutory language works to be legitimate did not seem a concern for
most of the judges (with a few exceptions); nor did the judges recognize
canons as judge-made policy. Most judges also did not seem to appreciate that learning about the legislative process might debunk certain
canons from common usage (for instance, why apply the rule against
superfluities if legislative drafters are often intentionally redundant?80).
At the same time, the judges we spoke with had no other articulated
reason for why they would use the canons, even if they did not reflect
congressional understanding or practice. This is not to say there might
not be such justifications;81 simply that none was offered.
While these results were not surprising, they are disappointing, given
the heavy use of the canons by lawyers and even these same judges. Is
the mere fact that canons may provide a common language for parties
in the legal system to talk about statutory cases enough to justify their
use, even if judges do not really have a justification for which ones are
used and why? One of us (Posner) thinks emphatically “no.”
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
76 See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[L]egislative express-reference or express-statement requirements may function as background canons of
interpretation of which Congress is presumptively aware.”); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525
U.S. 366, 397 (1999) (“Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it chooses to produce in a statute
will be resolved by the implementing agency.” (citation omitted)); Associated Gen. Contractors of
Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531 n.22 (1983) (“Congress . . . appear[s]
to have been generally aware that the statute would be construed by common-law courts in accordance with traditional canons.”).
77 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 7, at 913–16 (laying out the different justifications
courts have used for applying the various canons).
78 See id. at 906–07.
79 See id. at 907.
80 See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J.) (refusing to apply the
rule against superfluities because it makes unrealistic assumptions about congressional drafting).
81 For instance, textual canons might serve notice values, or policy canons might serve constitutional values.
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We also asked judges about their practice of citing canons in opinions. The judges’ answers to this question fell into three categories:
(1) the canons help explain outcomes for purposes of opinion writing but
do no real work; (2) they are helpful “guideposts” when deciding cases;
and (3) judges apply certain canons, without evaluation, because the
Supreme Court has so commanded. We asked about the “linguistic” or
“textual” canons, which are presumptions about how language is used
(for example, ejusdem generis is the concept that the meaning of a general term in a list should be construed in accordance with more specific
terms in the list, and expressio unius is the concept that the inclusion or
exclusion of express statutory terms presumes the intentional exclusion
or inclusion of others). We also asked about the “substantive” or “policy”
canons, which are normative presumptions (such as the rule of lenity,
which provides that courts construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants; or the presumption against preemption of state law;
or the canon of avoiding constitutional questions).
1. Canons as Tools of Persuasion, Not Decision. — “Like an Old
Song.” — Roughly one third of the judges told us that the canons are
“tools to make your arguments more persuasive or to persuade colleagues.” For these judges, the canons are primarily tools of opinion
writing. Linguistic canons especially, as opposed to policy canons, seem
to be of this “window dressing” variety. Eight judges made a comment
on the order of:
Linguistic canons, to be honest, I use after I have made up my mind to help
draft the opinion. It’s a good argument after the fact. If it fits the bill, even
if it is not central to my thinking, if I think it will help someone else organize
their thoughts I will throw it in.

Or: “I don’t think at [the canon] level when reading but when I’m writing the opinion I have to start explaining why we are doing it. . . . When
I have to write a cogent, intellectual-sounding defense I use them.”
Judges of all generations and political parties made similar statements.
One judge put it this way:
[Opinions] make law but they also help persuade people that this is the
correct reading and so when they get a chance to make a decision they
should follow it. So the canons among other things are like talking to other
players in the process. Talking to other judges, to other circuits. The canons
of construction add one more layer to the advocacy of an opinion. All of
this may be unnecessary to the party but there is a sort of coordination that
happens across the judiciary and canons tend to be persuasive.

Another told us that “sometimes they are helpful in explaining. It’s
like an old song.”
2. Canons as Useful Decision Tools, Planted in the Judge’s Mind. —
Twenty-six judges, including some who also said that the canons were
useful for opinion-writing purposes, reported at least some canons to be
genuinely useful to their decisionmaking processes. Several of the
younger judges seemed to realize that they referenced the canons almost
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unconsciously, largely because they were educated about them in law
school. One of these judges told us that he uses canons because he
“feel[s] obliged to use them,” thanks to learning them in law school as
the field’s doctrines. This, he explained, has both made him view the
canons as “a tool you have to deploy” and also shaped his thinking about
statutes in ways that cannot be consciously undone: “I try to think about
what [a statute] means and these things [canons] are popping into my
mind. If I had been educated differently maybe other things would pop
into my mind. I can’t help it.” Another younger judge told us that as a
practicing lawyer, statutory cases were his favorite cases to “brief and
argue because I liked the fact there was a relatively closed set of tools
and cases to work through. It was like a puzzle.” Another told us she
had been given a list of the canons “at baby judge school” and kept them
on her desk her first few years on the bench. In her view, the canons
are “helpful to cabin our role and limit our discretion. Yes, I do think
they help make decisions.”
The Gluck-Bressman empirical study of congressional drafting suggests that there may be a difference in canon awareness between
younger legislative drafters and older ones.82 Similarly, there appears to
be a generational effect among the judges we interviewed with respect
to how entrenched the canons are in their thinking that tracks the
dramatic rise of legislation courses in law schools over the past three
decades.
One younger judge in this category embraced canons for rule-of-law
reasons; he found that neutral rules help broker consensus among
judges. “The reason I like them,” he said, “is that if we use them it’s a
way of finding rules for things when we decide the cases. It’s a way of
being objective. . . . It allows judges of different ideological stripes to
decide cases.”
But most of the judges viewed the canons as “guidelines that are
helpful.” As one judge put it: “They are reminders of what I think intuitively is the answer anyway.” Another described them as a tool “that
reinforces a conclusion.” This reminder function does not seem insignificant. For instance, if the mere existence of the federalism canon has
conditioned judges to think about federalism in any case where a federalism question could present, then the canons have not done nothing.
The policy and constitutional canons in particular may be serving as
something of a checklist of norms that judges now intuitively consult in
statutory cases.
3. Lenity and Avoidance Are Special. — Some canons seem special.
Thirteen judges — some of whom find most canons useful only as posthoc window dressing and some of whom find canons more generally
useful — singled out lenity and/or constitutional avoidance as “actual
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
82 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 7, at 1022 (suggesting the “possibility that drafter
awareness of the canons is generational and is changing across time”).
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rules” and distinguished them from the other canons, in terms of their
mandatory application. They told us that these presumptions are “not
canons” but rather are “substantive law.” Some judges seemed to believe
these doctrines derived their special status simply because the Supreme
Court said they did. (This observation, to us, implies a view that the
Supreme Court could designate more canons to have this special status.
Nevertheless, and inconsistent with this observation, many of these
same judges later told us that the Supreme Court could not control
lower-court interpretive methodology when we asked that question.) A
few judges did not see these canons as deriving their power from the
Supreme Court, but rather from the Constitution (for example, that lenity derives from the constitutional concept that federal judges cannot
create crimes).
4. Canons in Opinions. — Many canons other than lenity and avoidance permeate judicial opinions, regardless of what judges say about
them. There are some useful observations to draw from this. First, we
think the role of the lawyers and the law clerks with respect to canon
citation practice cannot be overstated. As one judge told us:
Often [judges] get a bench memo and the bench memo cites canons. They may
be taken from the briefs. But then by the time they get to conference I can’t
remember anyone using canons to justify their vote, but they will end up in the
opinion. Why? I don’t know. Maybe [judges] go back to the bench memos.

If lawyers and law clerks argue in canons, judges who draw on briefs
or law-clerk work for opinion writing may be referencing canons in their
decisions too, even if those canons did not actually inform the judges
decisions.
We also think that the framing role that lawyers play in making
salient the key canons for each case has been underappreciated. As
noted, our random study of opinions from the judges we interviewed revealed that many canons used in the opinions were introduced by the
briefs. Professor William Eskridge and Lauren Baer have similarly
demonstrated, in the administrative deference context, that the Court relies heavily — sometimes quite literally — on the rationales provided in
the briefing in applying the deference canons (for instance, Chevron,
Skidmore,83 or Curtiss-Wright84) and that the regime chosen generally
defines the case.85
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
83 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (affording agencies’ interpretations weight
in accordance with their “power to persuade”).
84 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936) (affording especially
strong deference to the Executive’s interpretation of a statute related to matters involving foreign
affairs).
85 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1136–
44 (2008).
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There is something to be said here, too, about what seems to be the
impact of the exercise of opinion writing in this context. The values
that underlie judicial reason giving are well-trod scholarly ground.
Scholars and judges have argued that reason giving is central to judicial
legitimacy.86 Posner, among others, suggests that judicial reason giving
enhances accuracy and principled adjudication by forcing judges to articulate their decisionmaking process and thereby ensure that decisions
are not arrived at arbitrarily.87 Still others argue that reason giving
educates the public as to the workings of the law and makes law more
predictable.88 But when it comes to the use of reasons — especially the
canons — in statutory interpretation opinions, the reason giving process
seems, at best, only weakly tied to any of the above justifications. Because the canons themselves may not be real reasons that the judge relies
on in deciding, or to which he or she even generally commits, using them
to make opinions merely seem more legitimate and more lawlike to colleagues or the public does not further reason giving’s traditional goals.
Some have argued that judicial reason giving serves an analogous
role to precedent — a commitment to broader principles and a source
of constraint.89 There may be something to the fact that, in the absence
of a system of methodological precedent,90 canons do fill a void where
citation to precedent in other types of opinions would be more typical.91
Another explanation may be that using canons to justify opinions that
are, in fact, based on a much broader array of considerations, including
common sense, provides cover to judges who are insecure about otherwise embracing pragmatic, common law–type reasoning they wish to
employ in a field that is ostensibly guided by principles of legislative
supremacy. We are not the first to note that insecurity.92 But why
judges feel it is a subject that has yet to be deeply considered.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
86 E.g., Micah Schwartzman, Essay, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1004 (2008) (“[T]he
principle of legal justification is based on the idea that legal and political authorities act legitimately
only if they have reasons that those subject to them can, in principle, understand and accept.”);
Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1995).
87 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1421, 1447 (1995) (“In thinking about a case, a judge might come to a definite conclusion yet
find the conclusion indefensible when he tries to write an opinion explaining and justifying it.”).
88 E.g., Schwartzman, supra note 86, at 1008–10.
89 See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 656–57 (1995).
90 See infra Part VI, pp. 1343–47.
91 Cf. Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial
Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 660 (1992) (“With the modern statutorification of law, canons
increasingly serve the same alternative function as precedent does in the weak form of stare
decisis.”).
92 Eskridge and Professor Philip Frickey noted this insecurity many years ago. See Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 37, at 364 (“These two observations — the Court’s tendency to overstate arguments supporting its results and to understate the importance of evolutive factors — are related to
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What came across most saliently was that the judges we interviewed
had not thought deeply about the canons they deploy and why they deploy them. Even though most judges told us they were not bound to
use canons, and many disparaged them, all use them.
V. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGISLATURE
AND ROLE OF THE JUDGE
A different way to approach the question of why judges adopt the
interpretive methods they do is to inquire about their views of the judicial relationship to Congress. We asked the judges whether they thought
that understanding more about how Congress works would be relevant
to their interpretive processes. We offered, as an example, whether
knowing that a statute was drafted in different parts by multiple
congressional committees that did not communicate with one another (a
not uncommon occurrence in the real world93) would defeat the oftenapplied presumption of consistent usage — one of Scalia/Garner’s “most
favored” presumptions.94
We also asked the judges about the extent to which they see the judicial role vis-à-vis statutes as reparative, punitive, pragmatic, updating,
or none of these. And we asked whether they try to make statutory
language consistent regardless of whether they think Congress is trying
to be consistent. Many of the canons impose this kind of coherence on
statutes, and we had many judges both telling us that they themselves
use these canons but then, in answers to other questions, emphasizing
that judges must take statutes as they find them — that is, that they do
not see their role as improving on Congress’s work.
We did not find those perspectives to be consistent with one another.
Cohering a text that is not coherent at the outset is a version of improving on Congress’s work. Justice Scalia himself never acknowledged coherence as improvement, either, even as textualists maligned purposivists for their view of courts as Congress’s partners.
We also asked the judges whether they interpret statutes in ways
different from a textual reading to avoid absurd results and whether,
when confronting issues that Congress did not foresee, they try to make
statutes as sensible as possible or sometimes update them. We found
most judges willing to interpret around absurdities, and some who were
willing to update statutes, even though some of these judges had told us
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
one another, and related to what must be the primary reason for the continuing appeal of foundationalist theories of statutory interpretation: The Court remains insecure in the legitimacy of its
statutory interpretations. To justify such interstitial lawmaking, the Court feels it must establish a
compelling case for the interpretation based upon ‘objective’ evidence . . . .”).
93 See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 7, at 936–37; Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra
note 7, at 793.
94 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 170–73.
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in answers to other questions that we asked that it was not their job to
help Congress.
A. Value of Understanding Congress
All but seven of the judges we interviewed told us that understanding Congress is valuable for statutory interpretation. Many of these
judges had experience working on Capitol Hill earlier in their careers.
They told us that this background informed their views and gave them
a comfort level in working with statutes. For example, one judge commented, “I feel I have a good insight on how the legislative process
works and it is helpful. By contrast, I don’t know squat on how the
legislative process works [in the state capital] . . . . So when I get a question about state legislation I feel less certain . . . .” Several judges mentioned the idea of a Federal Judicial Center (FJC) training program on
the legislative process for judges.
Yet, in another puzzle, even among the judges with an interest in
how Congress works and a belief that such information is relevant to
the task of judging, very few had ever considered examples like the one
we raised (about not applying the presumption of consistency to statutes
drafted by multiple noncoordinating drafters), or had thought much
about applying knowledge of the legislative process to evaluating other
legislative presumptions.95 As one judge put it:
I have been around a long time. I understand how Congress works. I have
yet to see anyone argue something like the words in different statutes passed
at different times by different committees aren’t used consistently. It would
be interesting to have that issue litigated. I have never seen anyone arguing
that way about how Congress really works.

Another judge noted, “Yes, [a better understanding of the legislative
process] would be helpful. We have opinions saying the presumption
about consistent term usage is rebuttable, but we don’t have any opinions saying it’s rebuttable because of how Congress works.”
Puzzlingly, a handful of judges told us they were interested in how
Congress works specifically (and it seems only) because they thought it
helped debunk the case for legislative history. As the Gluck-Bressman
study illustrated, however, congressional drafters from both parties tend
to insist that legislative history is essential to understanding statutes.96
It is thus ironic that some of the judges told us that understanding
Congress is useful only to make the case against legislative materials.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
95

From the view of one judge who had thought about this question:
Knowing something about the legislative process is helpful. I don’t agree with the whole
act rule — that canon strikes me as particularly wacky. Statutes get amended dozens of
times by numerous different political coalitions. It’s so long no one can figure out what’s
in it. The idea that something put in the act in 1976 should be read the same way if it
uses the same language if that language is put in thirty years later, is ludicrous.
96 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 7, at 965.
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None of the judges who reported this interest also told us that understanding Congress could shed light on other interpretive questions or
the applicability of widely accepted canons, like presumptions of statutory perfection, that are not linked to how Congress actually drafts.
Previous legislative experience may be more relevant to a judge’s
general — often more forgiving — approach to statutes than to his or
her use of specific canons. Those with Capitol Hill experience emphasized how the practical understandings that come from knowing how
Congress works help with statutory interpretation cases. One judge
explained:
You can’t answer everything in a statute. You can see all of this in the
U.C.C. Originally there were fifty-nine provisions. Now there are 119.
They are trying to answer all the questions but you can’t. The codes get
longer and longer and longer. When that happens, when the statute is
vague, you have to work it out. You never say that we are doing the drafting
but, in some ways, you become a shadow legislator. You have to supply the
answer. We say we are doing interpretation and we aren’t trying to be
activist but you become a shadow legislator.

Understanding that statutes cannot cover every situation gives this
judge a sense of his role as “shadow legislator”; it legitimizes to his mind
the judge’s gap-filling function. Another judge of the younger generation said that her Capitol Hill experience made her skeptical about statutory interpretation tools that assume legislative perfection or
omniscience:
I am no master of the intricacies about how Congress works but I do have
a healthy understanding. You need to understand there is a slapdash quality
to what happens. You should not expect a level of precision in statutes that
isn’t there. It is a healthy understanding to have to understand stuff that
comes out of the process. No one has thought so much about comma placement, etc.

These sentiments were echoed by a judge of the older generation
who also worked on the Hill:
I think the public thinks that the process of statutory interpretation is much
easier than it actually is and that judges should have a much smaller role.
But Congress has its own problems in drafting. That is difficult. It is
almost an impossible task to cover the waterfront and have it work forever.
Sometimes there is a disconnect between what the Court thinks and the
processes of what judges are doing. Scalia’s idea of legislative supremacy
and judges just trying to carry out known directives is just not the fact.

Another judge agreed that understanding more about Congress
could assist appellate judges because briefs in the courts of appeals are
not always sufficiently sophisticated to tell the complex story of how
statutes are put together. “Maybe by the time you get to the Supreme
Court you have various amicus briefs,” he said, “but it is useful to know
about the legislative process. Why a statute looks the way it does.”
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Four judges expressed no interest at all in how Congress works. Two
other judges thought it would just be too difficult for judges to use such
knowledge. They argued that the process would be “essentially impenetrable by judges”; that “interpreting in light of a realistic understanding
of how legislative ‘sausage’ is made would somehow invade legislative
prerogatives, as well as confuse judges.” Another judge, in response to
the information about how multiple committee drafters defeat assumptions of consistency, said:
For me that’s a “whoa” moment, but if judges start worrying about that we
are asking for trouble. It’s the statute that’s enacted and we have to live
with it. It’s a terrible mistake if we start fooling around with that info.
Congress has got to understand how we are going to operate even if these
assumptions are fictitious.

Another said, “we’ll always be amateurs.” One judge referred to the
arguments by textualists that statutes are made up of impenetrable compromises.97 As a result, “learning the process won’t help judges with
that essential problem of not being able to get into the statutory deals,”
he said. “All you can do is look at the text agreed on. I agree with John
Manning on this.”98
1. Modest Interventions. — One recommendation, which we have
noted was made by several judges, is an FJC program to train judges
on the legislative process. We note that several appellate judges — not
necessarily included in our survey — already have tried to incorporate
real-world understandings of how Congress works into their opinion
writing. Both Justice Elena Kagan and D.C. Circuit Judge Brett
Kavanaugh recently have cast doubt on the well-worn “rule against superfluities” — the presumption that statutes are drafted without redundancies — in light of empirical evidence that congressional drafters are
often redundant — sometimes carelessly but frequently on purpose.99
Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson, also on the D.C. Circuit, recently cited
empirical work to argue that courts should not ignore legislative history
in determining the extent of an agency’s discretion.100 And Second Circuit Chief Judge Robert Katzmann has been arguing for many years for
greater incorporation of knowledge about the legislative process into
statutory interpretation doctrine.101
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
97
98

See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540–41 (1983).
See, e.g., Manning, supra note 14, at 430–31 (discussing the difficulty of ascertaining congressional intent in the context of legislative bargains).
99 Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1095–97 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting); Loving v. IRS,
742 F.3d 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
100 Council for Urological Interests v. Burwell, 790 F.3d 212, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J.,
dissenting in part) (citing empirical work, Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 7 for the proposition that legislative hitory can be used at Chevron Step One to disambiguate statutory text because
“Congress often uses legislative history,” rather than the text, to restrain agencies in the exercise of
their delegated authority).
101 KATZMANN, supra note 48, at 48–49.
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Focusing on only the judges, however, may be a weak strategy. It is
not clear whether judges would affirmatively seek to apply such information once learned, or whether information about the congressional
process would enter cases only if and when lawyers bring it in. It
seemed to us that many of these judges would be receptive to arguments
in legal briefs that bring information about congressional process to bear
on specific arguments about statutory interpretation, whether about
canons or the most relevant legislative history. As we have noted, canons are most often introduced by the lawyers in framing and briefing
cases, and then those same canons are taken by the judges in opinion
writing. Education of the practicing bar about the legislative process
might therefore have a significant effect on how canons are ultimately
used in opinions. Further, given the apparent influence of recent trends
in legal education on at least some of the judges we surveyed, we also
believe that more sophisticated law school courses in legislation and legislative process — courses that do more than merely teach the doctrines
but also critique and situate them in the context of real-world lawmaking — could have a salutary effect.
B. Imposing Consistency on Statutes
We also asked the judges whether they would impose consistency
and coherence on statutes even if they knew Congress had not. We
asked this question for two reasons. First, imposing consistency and
coherence on statutory language is the goal of many of the canons of
interpretation, and we were curious whether judges who told us they
deployed textual canons viewed them in this way. Second, a common
criticism of the use of purpose, legislative history, or pragmatism as interpretive tools is that those methods are “activist,” but so is imposing
coherence on statutory language where Congress itself did not impose
such coherence.
1. Do Not Impose Consistency Where Congress Did Not. — Of the
thirty-seven judges asked this question,102 eleven told us that they do
not or only rarely interpret statutes to make them more consistent or
coherent. Our random sample of the opinions of all judges interviewed,
however, illustrated that, at least in opinion writing, all of the judges we
interviewed used the cohering or coherence canons at least some of the
time. In applying these canons, it may be the case that judges do not
realize that they are imposing presumptions that Congress itself does not
impose.
Across the eleven who generally disfavored the coherence canons,
there were three kinds of responses. Some judges said they reject these
principles because they wish to stay true to what Congress wrote. They
told us, “I don’t want to impose a fake reading” or “I just try to get the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
102

Five were not asked this question.
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statute a fair reading.” Some judges said they were “wary of doing
something Congress didn’t do,” especially if it could upset a legislative
compromise. Others took a tough-love approach to Congress, saying,
“statutes are a mess; we shouldn’t clean them up” and “I really despise
the idea that we should make the statutes better.” Others described the
consistency principle as a weak norm, only to be used where it really
makes sense. For instance: “It might make sense in different statutes
closely enacted like the securities statutes, but I would not go further
than that to cohere statutes.”
2. Imposing Consistency and Coherence Even Where Congress Has
Not Is “Part of the . . . Judicial Function.” — In contrast, twenty-three
of the thirty-seven judges who were asked this question told us that
imposing consistency and coherence on statutes “is part of our job. . . .
It [is] the judicial function.” These judges were nearly equally split
across political party of the appointing President. Many emphasized
that this aspect of their interpretive work is about ensuring that statutes
give proper notice to the public — it is not necessarily about reflecting
Congress: “It is a good thing to impose coherence. It is unfair to ask the
reader to see terms of the statute differently.” Another emphasized “the
importance of consistency to judges and the public’s trust in what we
do. These are all factors that come into the judicial thinking on this.”
One noted textualist told us: “I do like the fact that Scalia and Garner
says we don’t presume that Congress knows everything but we act as
though they did because it is better to save than destroy.”
Most of the judges who answered in this vein did not associate this
cohering or reparative function with any kind of judicial activism or
judicial lawmaking. One rare comment (from a Republican appointee)
was: “I think this is usually our human nature. Try to get something
internally consistent, trying to make something rational that no one
thought about at the time. You become, whether you like it or not, a
mini-legislator.”103 Another (Democrat-appointed) judge said:
I take your point and I realize we are idealizing the legislature and saying
it legislates in a coherent way when it doesn’t. That’s true but without
those canons, but just in terms of the functioning of the judiciary and its
legitimacy in the eyes of the public I think there is an important role for
those kinds of canons.

That approach differs from how the Supreme Court normally talks
about its statutory interpretation work — both in the sense of the judicial function identified and in the candor and reflection about the work.
The idea that our common law judges view their role as guarding or
even improving on the integrity of the statutory code is not a conception
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
103 Two additional judges made observations about Congress that did not fit neatly into the categories described.
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of the judicial role that is closely associated with any of the dominant
theories of interpretation. Indeed, one of us has pointed out elsewhere
that this way of judging finds interesting parallels in aspects of civilcode judging, where achieving statutory coherence through interpretation is often a central function of the judicial role.104 The focus on the
code’s integrity also has relevance for our updating question, discussed
below.
C. Interpretation to Avoid Absurdity, to Advance
Common Sense, or to Update
This line of inquiry concluded with a question about whether judges
“try to make a vague or ambiguous statute as sensible as possible,” and
another question about whether they ever apply the so-called “rule
against absurdities,” under which judges depart from the text to avoid
absurd results. In our follow-up questions, we inquired whether judges
see it as within their role to update a statute’s language to fit modern
applications that were unforeseen (and might have been rejected even if
considered) by the enacting Congress.105
Nine judges were strongly against using a pragmatic approach to
address statutory ambiguities. One of these judges told us that if a statute was so vague that a judge had only his common sense to resort to,
he should “strike the statute down.” (We note this almost never actually
happens in statutory interpretation cases. Judges almost always address
issues of vagueness by giving the statute a narrowing construction,
rather than invalidating it.106) The other eight judges voiced their opposition to “cleaning up” Congress’s “mess” or “improving” statutes,
even though all of these judges would apply the rule against absurdities
to avoid a truly absurd result, and also the “scrivener’s error” rule to
correct a typographical or grammatical error. This stance is somewhat
puzzling to us, given these judges’ disavowal of pragmatism. Manning
observed long ago that the rule against absurdities is inconsistent with
textualism.107
The judges we interviewed may be taking their cues from the current
Court, which has often purported to adopt this stingy approach to correcting mistakes. For our part, however, we do not see, as a matter of

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
104 Abbe R. Gluck (forthcoming) (manuscript not yet titled) (research on file with author). Interestingly, in modern practice civil-code judges may now be more liberal interpreters than American
common law judges. See id.
105 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 352–57 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Posner,
J., concurring).
106 See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 405–11 (2010) (using the rules of lenity and
constitutional avoidance to narrow the honest services fraud statute in an Enron-related prosecution, rather than striking it down for vagueness, as the dissent would have done).
107 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2391–93 (2003).
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coherent theory, why a judge willing to fix a mistake viewed as a scrivener’s error or an absurdity would not also fix a different kind of obvious
statutory mistake or glitch.
Twenty-five judges told us that the idea of making vague or inscrutable statutes sensible was a necessary part of the judicial duty. One
judge told us: “Our job is to try to make sense of what Congress intended. All you can go on there is purpose. But you can’t say ‘I give
up’ and use whatever makes sense to me. You have to do your best to
figure out what Congress intended.” Another said: “Yes, we try to make
the statute work. If there is room I want the statute to fit and fit the
surrounding legal typography like you do in the common law. That is
a sensible starting point.” Another told us that common sense was important to reaching a “just result. . . . The equity of the statute is important to interpreting the statute.” Another said: “That’s the ballgame.
The whole ballgame is to make common sense out of it.”108
Several judges — interestingly, all noted textualists — couched this
approach in the idea of “delegated” lawmaking power, and even suggested that judges should be more open about what exactly they are
doing when they are filling gaps. This relates to the preoccupation we
heard throughout the interviews with the federal courts’ “legitimacy” in
the interpretive endeavor, a word we heard more than we had expected.
As one judge put it:
Yes, [judges should gap-fill,] with the qualification that judges have a duty
of candor. If the judge is uncertain how a case should be decided, he should
acknowledge his uncertainty in his opinion but explain that it is the judge’s
duty to decide cases even when uncertain as to the right decision.

Another said:
Congress has given interpretive power to the courts and in the process of
interpreting what Congress has said you are also filling out what it didn’t
say. That’s fair as long as you don’t go too far. That’s the inherent problem.
The legitimacy is based on the federal statute but behind that is the inherent
grant of authority in the statute to the judge.

Several judges of the older generation made the same point in the
way reproduced below, which typifies a way of thinking that we did not
see in the younger judges.
Consider, for example, the view of this older conservative judge, who
takes a very broad view of his authority:
It’s about legitimacy. I try to be faithful to that. I try to do what the
Congress said. I don’t want to adopt an interpretive enterprise for which I
don’t have authority. There is some inherent authority for when Congress
leaves A and B out there to decide, you have given it to the court. We then
have implied authority to go one way or the other. A lot of legislation is
like that. . . . When they are talking about congressional restraints on legislative action, reading statutes in ways that conform to those constraints is

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
108

Eight judges did not answer this question directly enough for us to categorize them.
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not a constraint on legislative power, it conforms to it. It’s deferential to
Congress. The enterprise for both is about legitimacy.

In contrast, the younger judges live in a post-Scalia interpretive
world, one in which canons appear in books, catalogued and marking
the basic boundaries of the field, and where themes of judicial restraint
and the promise of formalism are emphasized. Some of the younger
judges were quite surprised, when told after the interview of the different perspective we observed in the older judges. One, for instance said:
“Inherent authority, delegation — that’s really different from how we
think about it today.”
Another younger conservative judge explained that he sometimes relies on a common-sense approach but he prefers using canons as a way
to answer the question when other tools run out. To his mind, and
consistent with Justice Scalia’s message, canons are more objective and
allow for more consistency across decisions:
When it is obvious that Congress didn’t contemplate the thing at all that’s
really hard. That is a good place to have canons and be consistent about it.
Using canons consistently is a good thing. The instinct to do the interpretation that makes the most sense versus one that is canon driven is a hard
tension. But I would probably pick the canons approach.

Yet almost all of the judges we interviewed told us that they do support the absurdities rule, with the caveat that the language has to be
“truly absurd.” Of the twenty-six judges who responded to our followup question about updating, eighteen said they would update, but not
indiscriminately. Two focused on the age of the statute as giving greater
justification for updating; two focused on indicia of delegation to courts
(both noting that the Sherman Act is a particularly good example of a
statute that judges should update because of its brief and general language109); most of the others emphasized that updating is only appropriate if the updated reading can fit into the statutory text (even if Congress
was not thinking about the issue when drafting); two more emphasized
the fact that Congress generally does not do the hard updating itself and
so courts have no choice but to do it.
D. The Role of Eclecticism in the Judge-Congress Relationship —
Echoes of an Intent-Based Approach
The judges did not describe themselves as eclectic, but that is what
emerged as the dominant judicial approach to statutory interpretation
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
109 Cf. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (“From the
beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute. . . . ‘In antitrust, the
federal courts . . . act more as common-law courts than in other areas governed by federal statute.’”
(second omission in original) (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 98
n.42 (1981))); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1052 (1989); Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are
“Common Law Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW
89, 91–92 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
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in our sample. The judges later confirmed these impressions when we
asked them about it in the follow-up questions. The goal that this
eclecticism aims to serve is a central question. The judges we spoke
with indicated that the eclecticism is legitimating — we were surprised
by how many judges were focused on their own legitimacy as much as
they were — because it allows them to check their answers across all
kinds of materials.
The eclecticism seems tied to the judges’ sense, which we heard from
many, that they are the second seat to Congress when it comes to statutes. Indeed, most of the judges we spoke with were much more focused
on congressional intent and purpose than one would think from reading
Supreme Court opinions alone. Despite the judges’ disavowals of “purposivism” and their use of Justice Scalia’s canons, virtually all of the
judges we spoke to — including the text-centric ones — do appear focused on figuring out what Congress meant or what Congress would
have done had it noticed the gap in the statute at issue. Consulting a
lot of materials is their main way of doing this.
As one judge said:
When text doesn’t really give you the answer why wouldn’t you want to be
eclectic? It seems a little odd to be dogmatic. The standard view is that
the eclecticism is bad because it gives discretion to judges but that seems
like a misplaced objection because on most of these questions I don’t think
the judge cares all that much about the answer, we just want to have a sense
they are doing what the legislature wanted.

Although none of the judges described himself or herself as an “intentionalist,” it appears to us that the judges’ universal interest in linking
interpretation to Congress — which is not the textualist or formalist
mission as traditionally described — is why almost all do indeed care
about purpose and legislative history, and why few care about things
like dictionaries (which are not linked to Congress). This is also probably why none of our judges self-identified as a strict textualist.
VI. RELATIONSHIP TO THE SUPREME COURT, INCLUDING
THEORIES OF PRECEDENT
Most of the judges we interviewed did not hold the Supreme Court’s
approach to statutory interpretation in high regard. The wooden nature
of the current Court’s approach combined with inconsistencies across
the Court’s statutory interpretation opinions seemed to be contributing
factors. Perhaps relatedly, and linked to several ongoing theoretical and
doctrinal debates, most of the judges we interviewed did not view the
Court’s interpretive methodology as binding on them or as precedential.
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But the judges divided over why there is no “methodological stare decisis” in the federal courts.110
Methodological stare decisis, as one of us has detailed, is the treatment of statutory interpretation rules as precedents, just as courts treat
analogous decisionmaking rules such as the parol evidence rule or
burden-shifting regimes.111 Although the federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, generally “give ‘super strong’ stare decisis effect to substantive statutory precedents”112 (interpretations about what a statute
substantively means), the federal courts generally do not treat the methodology (the rules, presumptions, or other tools it applies) as precedential
for the next case, even where the same statute is being construed.113
Federal judges often take the position that neither superior courts, nor
Congress, can control their statutory interpretation methods.114
There is arguably no other area of law in which judges behave in
this way — namely, in which Article III judges believe the decisionmaking rules for cases cannot be controlled by Congress or the Court.115
The lack of methodological stare decisis also dooms any formalist enterprise in statutory interpretation because it prevents a predictable approach from taking hold. We wondered how the judges we interviewed
viewed this issue and also what, in their view, might justify
treating statutory interpretation methodology as different from other
decisionmaking rules.
1. Judges Who Believe the Supreme Court Can and Does Dictate
Statutory Interpretation Rules. — Only six judges (four conservative,
two liberal) gave an outright affirmative response to the question of
whether the Supreme Court could dictate lower-court interpretive methodology. Representative responses were: “Yes the Supreme Court approach is binding. They tell us not just what we decide but how;” and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
110 Cf. Gluck, supra note 4, at 1823–24 (illustrating this phenomenon and noting the presence of
methodological stare decisis in some state courts).
111 Gluck, supra note 19, at 1970–76, 1978–80.
112 Id. at 1917.
113 Id. at 1917–18.
114 Federal courts do not even consistently apply the Erie doctrine, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938), to state statutory interpretation cases. Where Erie commands that federal
judges apply state law to state legal questions, federal judges often ignore state statutory interpretation rules when interpreting state statutes. See Gluck, supra note 19, at 1924–58.
115 To be clear, the claim is not that overarching theories of interpretation should be given a firm
legal status, but rather individual decision rules. In the constitutional context, for instance, we do
not treat originalism as law but we do treat the tiers of scrutiny and the First Amendment balancing
tests as precedential law. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION
5 (2001) (“A distinctive feature of the Supreme Court’s function involves the formulation of constitutional rules, formulas, and tests, sometimes consisting of multiple parts.”); Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 167 (2004) (distinguishing “statements of judgeinterpreted constitutional meaning from rules directing how courts should adjudicate claimed violations of such meaning” and calling the latter “constitutional decision rules”). For a more detailed
exposition of this argument, see Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory
Interpretation: Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053 (2017).
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“[w]e can disagree on the outcome but if the Court tells us we have to
use a canon, we have to.” One judge not included in this group put it
this way: “It is sort of dicta but it is also reasoning. . . . We should follow
it.” Three other judges not included in the aforementioned group told
us that they do not view the interpretive methodology as binding, but
use it “because it is persuasive to your colleagues and whoever is reviewing.” Two others made clear that the Supreme Court’s approach affects
how they decide cases, but not because they feel bound by theories of
precedent:
That is not to say I don’t use their methods sometimes, but I don’t think
about it as a question of following them. With preemption and retroactivity,
those are their canons and I do follow them. I don’t think I would cite them
for expressio or ejusdem but God help me a law clerk might throw a cite in.
I am much more interested in a court holding than how they got there.

2. Judges Who Believe the Supreme Court Cannot Dictate Statutory
Interpretation Rules. — Fifteen of the judges did not think that the
Supreme Court has the power to bind lower-judge interpretive methodology, even if it wanted to. Some of these judges took this position because they view the interpretive rules as common sense, “tools,” or “useful guides,” but not as legal principles that could bind. The rest of them
were in the camp that poses the most challenging jurisprudential question about statutory interpretation — namely, why statutory interpretation seems so much more inherently personal to the individual Article
III judge than do analogous decisionmaking rules116 in other contexts in
which the Supreme Court unquestionably dictates the controlling rule.
Even among these judges, however, there were exceptions for certain
canons. One judge said the exceptional doctrines — the ones that are
indeed binding — are the ones based on “constitutional principles.” Another judge singled out a few canons — namely, lenity, preemption, and
avoidance — as “rule[s] of law, not . . . interpretive principle[s]” to which
he would defer. Another said: “In practice, I would definitely pay very
close attention to how they decide a case, but I don’t really know that
the way the system is structured and Article III that it would bind me
as a judge.” Others were more definitive: “I don’t think those [imposing
interpretive rules] are in their power.” Even some who argued that “it’s
not part of the holding,” admitted they would be “more skittish the next
time” to use an interpretive tool or rule disavowed by the Supreme
Court.
In contrast, when asked in the very next question about Chevron
deference — the interpretive rule that courts must defer to reasonable
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes — every interviewed judge
told us this rule is binding even if they disagreed with it. Not a single
judge made the connection between the previous question — about the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
116 Including, but not limited to, the parol evidence rules, the burden-shifting rules, and the tiers
of scrutiny.
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potential for other methodological rules to be binding — and what was,
to them, the indisputable precedential weight of Chevron.
3. Judges Who Believe the Supreme Court Could, but Has Not Yet,
Dictated Interpretive Rules Because the Court Is Too Inconsistent. —
Eleven said the Supreme Court’s methodological approach is not precedential because the Court itself has not decided on a consistent approach, and not because the Court does not have the power to impose
methodology as rules of law.117 They made comments on the order of:
“I don’t feel particularly bound by the Supreme Court because they
aren’t consistent” and “[t]he Supreme Court has such a varied approach
to all this, I’m not sure there is a consistent message being given to us.”
Typical of this group was the comment that the Supreme Court could
establish rules of interpretation, but has not yet spoken with sufficient
clarity to do so. One put it this way:
Does their methodology bind us? To the same extent that it binds them. If
they say “our statutory methodology is we allow agencies to resolve ambiguity using things like legislative history and policy,” then that Chevron rule
binds us because they say, “that’s our interpretive rule.” On the questions
that divide textualists . . . and pragmatists, you have textualists and pragmatists on the Supreme Court and neither of them has been squelched by
the other, so why would judges on the courts of appeals feel squelched either
way?

Another said:
On the surface, the tools we use look the same, but [the Court isn’t] bound
by anything. They are so much more free-form than we on the Court of
Appeals are allowed to be. So it goes the other way. They present to be
bound, and really are hardly bound at all. We are very much bound by
what the Supreme Court tells us to do. My conservative colleagues try to
curry favor with Justice Scalia by not looking at legislative history, but I
don’t feel bound by that even when he has a majority of the Court. We’d
have to distinguish between different types of interpretive tools. I take the
word “presumption” seriously. I do feel bound by the presumptions against
preemption. I do take those seriously and feel bound by them. But not by
the way the Court says we should go about interpreting congressional
meaning.

* * *
These answers lend support to our previous intuitions — that despite
the prevalence of statutory cases on the federal docket, most federal
judges have given very little thought to why they apply the interpretive
rules that they do and the legal status of those rules. We do not intend
to single out our interviewees for special criticism: the Supreme Court
itself does not appear to have given serious thought to these questions,
and that ambivalence about the legal status of interpretive rules, as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
117

Five judges did not directly answer the question.
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many of the judges we spoke to noted, has trickled down. However, it
remains a jurisprudential puzzle. We cannot think of another area of
law in which there is so much uncertainty as to whether the rules to be
applied could be dictated either by the Supreme Court or by Congress,
and no concrete theory to govern that conclusion.
4. Judges Do Not Want More Guidance from the Supreme Court. —
At the same time, no one wanted more guidance from the Supreme
Court. Most of the judges expressed more confidence in their own
court’s abilities than in those of the Supreme Court. They made comments like: “I actually think my court does a pretty good job. We work
really hard. . . . I’m very happy with the way things are.”; “I don’t want
guidance from the Supreme Court. I do not think they are intellectually
particularly sophisticated. I think the lower federal courts are pretty
good. I would much rather argue with some other court of appeals
judges like Frank Easterbrook and the late Richard Arnold than the
Supreme Court.”; “I don’t know what I would get from the Supreme
Court. I have no confidence in them.”; and “I am very comfortable with
where my court is.”
Others wanted even less guidance from the Supreme Court. One
said: “I don’t think it would be hugely helpful to have lots of instructions
from them on how to interpret statutes, especially because I don’t think
they could give the instructions in ways that could be clear.” Another
recognized the risk of settling on a single interpretive methodology: one
can never be sure which rules the Supreme Court will pick. That judge
said, “As of right now I am more comfortable getting less guidance from
the Supreme Court because I don’t know what it would be.” We suspect
this fear drives some of the other judges’ resistance to methodological
stare decisis, too.
5. Guidance from Congress? — A few judges wanted “more guidelines from Congress.” Others said all they would ask from Congress is
to “just write better statutes! That’s the problem. They are so poorly
drafted and we as lower courts are stuck trying to figure out what
Congress intended.” Another said: “If Congress could pay more attention to remedies and retroactivity and stuff like that when they are drafting, it would be a lot better. It would be better if Congress would think
through the application of that statute, who gets to sue, what do they
get to sue for — that would be helpful.” Chief Judge Katzmann has
recommended something in this vein, namely, a “checklist” for congressional drafters so as to reduce “oversights” and make “legislative intent”
clearer.118
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
118 KATZMANN, supra note 48, at 93–94. A checklist might include, for example, the issues of:
“attorneys’ fees, private rights of action, preemption, statutes of limitations, effective dates, and
exhaustion of administrative remedies.” Id. at 93; see also Kavanaugh, supra note 48, at 2133
(“agree[ing] fully” with the checklist approach that Chief Judge Katzmann describes).
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VII. DEFERENCE TO AGENCIES AND CHEVRON SKEPTICISM
Although every judge we interviewed told us that he or she was
bound by Chevron — and all but one of the judges did apply that rule
in opinions119 — most of the judges we interviewed do not favor the
Chevron rule. Here is where we see a “D.C. Circuit effect” in our study.
All but one of the D.C. Circuit judges we interviewed — who were of
different generations and political parties — were admirers of Chevron
deference, whereas most other judges from the other courts of appeals
were decidedly anti-Chevron.
Some said something similar to this judge’s comment: “I apply it
because I don’t see any way out of it.” One complained that “agencies
are very muscular nowadays.” Another said: “[T]he problem is that the
administrative agencies are not independent. Sometimes there is a good
reason to defer but it happens more and more and more. . . . I don’t like
it because I don’t like administrative agencies and I don’t like deference
to dependents.” Some expressed skepticism about Chevron’s fiction of
delegation, arguing that: “for actual delegations, Chevron is acceptable,
but that a lot of times judges are talking about delegation, but nothing
has really been delegated to the agency. Then I’m skeptical about using
the Chevron approach.”
The judges expressing skepticism regarding Chevron divide equally
among liberals and conservatives. Consider, for instance, a comment
from one of each perspective, of the same generation and court of appeals: “I follow Chevron, Skidmore, and Mead, but if I had my oats, I
would get rid of most of the agencies altogether because they do a terrible job, and it is very bad lawyering”; and:
[Since] Chevron is the law, I am obliged to use it. I think it is a terrible rule.
Chevron isn’t just a throw-away canon, it is a basic law. It’s terrible. We
should use agency expertise when [agencies] are assessing facts. That’s what
they are good at. They don’t know more about the meaning of statutes than
I do. It’s my job to interpret statutes.

Here are two more judges, again liberal and conservative, from the
same generation (but a different generation from the above pair) and on
the same court of appeals: “I would prefer a little less deference to the
agency. It’s so unseemly: You don’t want an agency changing its view
with every President;” and “from a personal standpoint, I would prefer
that I had more authority, but I do feel that we have to apply the deference that the Supreme Court has set out. There’s a lot of agency
self-interest involved — the natural agency tendency toward selfaggrandizement.” Only four non–D.C. Circuit judges said they were
satisfied with the balance Chevron strikes, specifically pointing to how
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
119 That judge was a recent appointee who had not had a case requiring a citation of Chevron
yet, but who had signed onto numerous opinions citing the case.
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it relieves judges of having to do extra work or go too deeply beyond
their expertise.
Because all of the judges told us that they felt bound by Chevron,
we were not surprised to see little evidence of their distaste for the doctrine in opinions. Nevertheless, in our random sampling of their opinions, we found that three judges who were particularly emphatic about
their dislike of Chevron did defer less than fifty percent of the time (a
lower rate of deference than the others) and expressed Chevron skepticism in opinions. Another judge who told us he obeyed the doctrine but
had come to question it wrote opinions that reflect that as well.
We note that Chevron has come under more academic and judicial
attack recently, in large part linked to the stated opposition to the doctrine by newly confirmed Supreme Court Justice Gorsuch. Even though
the most vocal public critics of the rule tend to be associated with legal
conservatism,120 our survey indicates that judicial discomfort with
Chevron may be more common, and politically balanced, than one might
think. To that end, it is relevant that thirty-five out of the forty-two
judges we interviewed were interviewed before Justice Gorsuch’s nomination. It is possible that some judges would be less frank with us
today about their Chevron skepticism, given that the nomination politicized the Chevron debate to some extent.
The D.C. Circuit judges we spoke with are different. They accept
Chevron as part of the basic wiring of how that court decides cases and
generally are comfortable with it. As one said:
I’ve gotten to the point where I don’t much care; I can understand both
sides of it. It does establish a framework that keeps us somewhat confined. . . . I’m just not sure that without the framework judges would do a
better job than agencies. What I’ve come to believe is that as long as we
are within a clear framework, it confines us in good ways. I think Chevron
is relatively clear . . . . In our Circuit we have gotten into a routine in applying it.

Although one D.C. Circuit judge told us that “generally, I do think
Chevron is a good rule,” and another that “because the issues of statutory
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
120 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) (suggesting that Chevron is unconstitutional); Jonathan H. Adler, Restoring
Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L. REV. 983, 983 (2016) (noting “Chevron’s domain is under siege”
(footnote omitted)). Justice Thomas has written a series of opinions criticizing Chevron deference
and other forms of judicial deference to agency interpretations. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.
Ct. 2699, 2712–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2529 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213–25 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); cf. Wellness Int’l
Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1961 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the system
of separated powers as not permitting the exercise of another branch’s delegated power); Dep’t of
Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240–45 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (same). Some liberals have attacked Chevron too. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the
Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be
Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779 (2010).
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interpretation do involve policy consequences, and because the agency
is supposed to be knowledgeable about that, and because the agency is
susceptible to political influence and policy, it makes sense,” two expressed some new reservations about Chevron. As one put it: “I’ve become somewhat more doubtful as time has moved on, I guess because
of fear of usurpation of Congress.”
VIII. MORE ON THE JUDGES’ INDIVIDUAL APPROACHES
For our final series of questions, we asked the judges how they developed their own interpretive approaches; how they would characterize
their own interpretive approaches; how they use (or do not use) lawyers
and law clerks in statutory cases; and an open-ended final question designed to elicit anything we had left out. The most salient finding is the
one we already have noted: namely, that almost no one was willing to
identify him or herself as either an unqualified textualist or purposivist.
In addition, all of the judges seemed to have developed their approaches
“on the job,” without self-conscious election. Previously held jobs, unsurprisingly, had an important influence.
A. Judicial Approaches Adopted Incrementally, Case by Case
One surprising response we received from many judges is that they
“never thought about” how they developed their approach. Most told
us it was “experiential.” And many emphasized that they don’t have “a
theory.”
Those who had previously worked in government stood out from the
others, in terms of the formative nature of that work for many judges.
Many told us that, as government lawyers, they worked frequently with
statutes, and that work influenced their later perspectives as jurists.
One put it this way: “My coming at it continuously for now twenty-eight
years, it’s experience.” Another said that our question — how judges
came to develop their own interpretive approaches — “makes it sound
more deliberate and informed than it could possibly be. I’m just a common law judge, and I make sense of it.” Several mentioned that they
read books written by experienced judges, including Posner and Chief
Judge Katzmann. A few were influenced by the judges they clerked for
and the kinds of fights in which their mentor-judges engaged with
judges at the opposite extreme. As one said: “Trial and error. I worked
for two very different [judges] before. . . . I read the literature both of
you guys write. My fear of getting it wrong is a big driver for me.”
We were somewhat surprised that no judges mentioned specific subject matters as driving forces behind their choice of interpretive approach, apart from the many judges who singled out the rule of lenity
as important in criminal cases. Instead, all seemed to accept our general
premise that judges have a basic approach that applies to all kinds of
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cases. We cannot offer firm conclusions on this point, however, because
we did not ask them about subject-specific approaches.
B. Role of Lawyers and Law Clerks
The judges also divided down the middle regarding the helpfulness
of law clerks and lawyers in statutory interpretation cases. Several
judges told us that law clerks who have “had a course in law school
exclusively dealing with statutory interpretation . . . bring more to the
table. It’s a very sharp distinction.” Another judge told us that clerks
are helpful because they “come up with possible ways of doing things in
contrast to my original reaction to the case.” (On the other hand, some
of the judges seemed to have none of these clerks! They complained
that their clerks do not come prepared on the rules of statutory interpretation.) Most of the judges acknowledged limits to “what the law clerks
can do,” and explained that they usually have to be taught what to look
for. One judge pointed out what may be a generational effect of the
way legislation is currently taught in law schools: “Coming out of law
school, the [law clerks] tend to know the Scalia and Garner approach
pretty well. They may be more textualist than I am. They often give
me five to eight pages of statutory text rather than really getting into
the cases. I would love to get my law clerks past that.”
With respect to lawyers, most of the judges recognized the varying
quality of lawyers’ briefs and told us they freely discarded the briefs of
counsel of poor quality. Many judges mentioned that lawyers’ efforts at
zealous advocacy in statutory interpretation cases often backfire and
make them less helpful to the courts, with each side being overly rigid,
or both sides insisting their reading of the text is the only clear reading.
Here, too, we saw a D.C. Circuit effect. Our D.C. Circuit judges repeatedly mentioned the high quality of the government counsel often before
their court as a benefit. They emphasized that government lawyers and
their briefs can be very helpful. The following comment is a good
example:
By and large government counsel are quite good, with few exceptions. Some
are extraordinary. We are likely to get a lot of help in government briefs.
The other side’s briefs vary a lot more. Some appointed lawyers, like lawyers appointed under the Criminal Justice Act, are quite unhelpful in cases
involving statutory interpretation. But big law firms are really terrific. I
generally get a lot of help from the briefs on statutory interpretation. It’s
help in the sense they both explore the statute and their possible interpretations pretty thoroughly. When they are unmatched, I myself and clerks have
to figure out the other side.

Most of the judges recognized that “lawyers are all over the board”
and that many “aren’t really as helpful as they should be.” One judge
pointed out that:
[Lawyers] are obsessed with plain meaning. You get both parties each arguing his interpretation is plain meaning. How can it be you have the same
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phrase that has opposite “plain, literal meaning” — not as a matter of history
or purpose, but just as a matter of literal meaning? It’s a masquerade, but
they harp on that.

Another similarly told us the lawyers are often not helpful because they
are too “scripted.”
C. Is Statutory Interpretation Different from Other Modes
of Judicial Decisionmaking?
Finally, about one third of the judges we interviewed commented on
how statutory interpretation cases differ from other kinds of cases. One
judge emphasized the fact that most statutory cases, unlike constitutional cases, involve relatively recently drafted text: “In interpreting the
Constitution, you often have the lay of the land and something that was
written two centuries ago, and you have to be well aware of changes in
language and context. But most of the statutes that we interpret are less
than 100 years old.”
Most of the judges, however, focused on the fact that, in statutory
interpretation, the judge has to be “more constrained.” Several judges
thought that statutory interpretation was more “objective” than constitutional interpretation. As one put it:
I think constitutional questions and answers are more malleable based on
the nature of the document and the history of inquiry. It’s much looser. I
don’t feel that way about statutory interpretation. I feel there is a railroad
track and I take the train.

One judge told us he was more comfortable deciding statutory cases
because Congress can always fix an error in interpretation. Another
judge told us, in contrast, that he is especially cautious in statutory cases
because the courts rarely overturn statutory interpretation holdings
themselves (contrasted with constitutional law holdings, which courts
more readily revise).
A different way of articulating the difference came from this judge:
Constitutional and statutory interpretation on the one side, we’re supposed
to be carrying out someone else’s charge. The common law is very different.
In the common law world, where there’s a statutory delegation like the
Sherman Act or a constitutional delegation like the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, then we are the primary anchor. You have a different approach when you are carrying out other people’s commands than when you
are trying to figure out the best answer.

IX. CONCLUSION
Our study of federal appellate judges reveals a host of topics about
statutory interpretation that pose far more interesting questions than do
the old debates about text versus purpose. The study also adds more
context to our understanding of interpretation than what emerges from
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the Supreme Court’s cases and most of the academic literature about
the field.
The last three decades’ march toward a more formalist approach to
interpretation seems more qualified in the lower courts, even though it
indisputably has shaped the thinking of many judges. We saw in our
interviews the influence of that progression in the younger judges’ internalization of many of the canons of construction. But most of the
judges whom we interviewed still emphatically defended their willingness to consult all available materials as the most legitimate way, in their
view, to reach the right result and one consistent with Congress’s intent.
We also saw the influence of formalist thinking in how our judges
think about opinion writing and about public perceptions of their own
legitimacy. Most of the judges we interviewed implied that, whatever
their own views, their sense of what the public may perceive as the appropriate decisionmaking approach may be different. Most of the
judges indicated that they are not fully explicit, in their opinions, about
what seems to be a common law–type decisionmaking approach. Instead, they seem to see the public legitimacy of the endeavor as requiring
more formalist reasoning — and more doctrinal use of the canons —
than the decisionmaking process itself. The question of how much work
the canons are really doing and how much is mere “show” (or cover for
the common law tools they wish to deploy) is difficult to resolve. It also
illuminates a possible tension between the internal and external sense of
judicial role that judges seem to experience in statutory cases.
That tension may also be behind some of the resistance that the
judges we interviewed feel to using methodological precedent in statutory interpretation. An approach that is closer to a common law and/or
pragmatic approach may be less amenable to doctrinalization by methodological precedent than an approach that is truly guided by the
canons, exclusionary rules for certain materials, or other interpretive
approaches.
We also wonder whether these federal court of appeals judges really
are more pluralistic in their approach than the Supreme Court Justices,
or whether we simply were able to have more candid conversations with
them. But maybe the nature of the Court’s bench — the same nine
Justices sitting together on every case — requires a more formalist approach in order to garner majorities given the particular methodological
outlook of those Justices. In the last few years of Justice Scalia’s life,
for instance, it was common to see opinions that placed all discussion of
legislative history in a final, separate part, so that Justice Scalia could
join the entire opinion except that part. That kind of methodological
insistence and the lack of rotating panels may make the Court’s interpretive approach more regimented in more cases. Time will tell how
the death of Justice Scalia affects this.
These observations do not explain all of our findings. For instance,
why do judges, even with the common law and pragmatic sensibilities
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we saw in many of them, feel comfortable amending statutes to eliminate absurdities but not other mistakes? Why is it that the D.C. Circuit
judges — the judges on the court with the most experience with administrative law — appear to be much more strongly in favor of the Chevron
deference principle than others? How do judges really understand their
role and what legitimates it? These are some of the most important and
intriguing questions for the future of the field. Our study reveals the
benefits of approaching them from a vantage point that extends beyond
the Supreme Court.
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APPENDIX: REPRESENTATIVE INTERVIEWS
We reproduce here six interviews that characterize the different types
of judges we interviewed. We have redacted where necessary to preserve confidentiality.
We asked each judge the following nineteen questions, plus three
additional follow-up questions.121 We do not reprint the questions for
each judicial response reproduced below, but each response tracks this
same questionnaire.122 In some cases, questions were skipped, typically
because they were answered in the context of other questions.123
Q1. When you get a case involving statutory interpretation, where
do you begin in determining how the case should be decided?
Q2. What do you do if the statutory provision that you are asked to
interpret is either ambiguous or vague? What role does plain meaning
play in your interpretation of statutes?
Q3. Do you find dictionaries helpful in assigning meaning to a vague
or ambiguous statutory provision?
Q4. Our survey uses the word “canons” in a broad sense — although
we understand that not everyone does that. Some of the canons are
linguistic in the sense of concerning the relations between words in the
statutory provision to be interpreted. An example is the canon that a
word in different parts of the same statute should mean the same thing.
Some of the canons concern relations between the statutory words and
a policy or norm. Examples are the rule of lenity in criminal cases, the
presumption against inferring that a federal statute preempts a state
statute, the canon of constitutional avoidance, and the presumption favoring American Indian tribes in interpreting a statute relating to a
tribe. Are there particular canons of statutory construction (in either of
the two senses in which we’re using the term) that you find either helpful
or not helpful in statutory interpretation?
Q4A. Do you cite canons in judicial opinions? If so, why?
Q5. Do you ever rely on legislative history to help you determine the
meaning of a statute? If so, what types of legislative history do you find
most and least helpful?
Q6. Further, on the topic of Congress, do you think it important or
at least helpful that judges understand the details of the legislative process — for example the role of congressional staff in drafting, relative to
the role of the legislators themselves, or how statutes are sometimes
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
121 As noted, nineteen of the first thirty-five judges we interviewed responded to the follow-up
questions. The remaining seven were asked the questions as part of their initial interview.
122 In some cases, judges anticipated the next question and answered a later-coming question
together with an earlier one. For those judges, we skipped the later question. We occasionally
skipped other questions in the interest of time for extremely long interviews.
123 Questions 4 and 4A and 13 and 14, for instance, were often answered together. Question 18
is not listed with a response when one judge told us she or he had nothing else to add that we had
not asked about.
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drafted by multiple committees, each taking responsibility for just one
part of the statute and perhaps not even communicating with the other
committees? Could or should such insights into the legislative process
influence statutory interpretation — for example might or should a
judge’s awareness of multiple-committee drafting undermine the canon
of construction noted earlier that the same statutory term or language
has the same meaning throughout the entire statute?
Q7. Do you think it a proper judicial task to try to interpret a statute
in a way that will make it internally consistent even if there is no indication that Congress focused on internal consistency?
Q8. Relatedly, do you ever try to determine the purpose behind the
statute and interpret the statute so it will be most effective in achieving
that purpose?
Q9. Do you think it a proper aim of judicial interpretation of statutes
to try to make a vague or ambiguous statute as sensible as possible, at
least with reference to issues of interpretation that Congress may not
have foreseen arising?
Q10. Do you agree or disagree that the plain meaning of a particular
statutory provision can be disregarded if adopting that meaning as the
statutory meaning would yield absurd results or deflect the obvious legislative aim?
Q11. How did you develop your own approach to statutory interpretation?
Q12. The Supreme Court decides many statutory cases, often invoking canons of statutory construction, dictionary definitions, legislative
history, and other sources of interpretive guidance. Do you feel bound
by whatever methods the Court uses in interpreting statutes? That is,
are interpretive rules laid down by the Court holdings that operate as
precedents in future cases involving statutory interpretation?
Q13. Thus far our implicit focus has been on statutory issues that
arise in appeals from federal district courts. But often such issues arise
from decisions by federal administrative agencies, decisions that, like
those of district courts, are appealable to a federal court of appeals. Do
you treat such appeals differently from how you treat appeals from district courts?
Q14. How much weight do you give to doctrines, such as Chevron,
Mead, and Skidmore, that counsel strong deference to the interpretation
of vague or ambiguous statutory provisions by the agencies charged
with administering them? Do you think those doctrines strike the right
balance between judicial and administrative interpretation of statutes?
Q15. Is there a single word that would describe your approach to
statutory interpretation, such as textualist, contextualist, purposivist, or
pragmatist, or anything else?
Q16. What role do the lawyers and your law clerks play in how you
analyze a statutory interpretation case and explain your decision in your
opinion?
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Q17. Do you think the way that the federal courts are interpreting
statutes is working well? Would you want more guidance on statutory
interpretation from Congress or the Supreme Court?
Q18. Is there anything I haven’t asked you that you consider important to how you interpret statutes, or that differentiates in your mind
statutory interpretation from common law and constitutional decisionmaking?
FOLLOW-UP #1. The dominant theme that emerged from the first
thirty-five interviews that we conducted is that federal appellate judges
are quite eclectic in their approach to statutory interpretation: almost
everyone we spoke with was willing to consider text, canons, legislative
history, practical considerations, etc., to some degree. We would be very
interested to hear your reaction to this. Specifically, why do you think
federal appellate judges are so eclectic in their approach? Do you think
this eclecticism is laudable or problematic, and why?
FOLLOW-UP #2. Although we asked about the judge’s role when a
case implicates a statutory question that Congress did not foresee when
drafting, we did not ask specifically about the judge’s role in updating
statutory language to harmonize an older statute with the modern legal
context. Is that something you feel is part of the judicial function in
statutory cases?
FOLLOW-UP #3. Although we discussed at length the various tools
judges use to decide cases, we did not discuss how you actually come to
your decision, or at what point in reviewing the materials — whether
bench memos, briefs, or other materials — the decision generally becomes solidified in your mind. Recognizing this may be hard to articulate, is it possible for you to describe to us how that happens for you?
A. The Most Text-Oriented Type of Judge
Q1. I [start by] ask[ing] what does the statute say.
Q2. If I think the provision is ambiguous, I do a couple of things.
First of all, I look at the cases and see if someone else has already decided this. We have quite a lot of law in this circuit. We may not only
have said something about a statute, but maybe did it — definitively
interpreted it — a few times. Then I look at structure. At some point,
I’ll start looking at tools like legislative history. I’ll look at almost anything in that — committee reports, floor statements. I’m skeptical of it,
but I most certainly will look at it.
If the meaning were absolutely plain, that would be the end of it for
me. In the original version of CAFA enacted in 2005, there was a provision that the time for filing was not less than seven days after the
district court issued its order. It turned out that it was seven days or
more. It looked like a seven-day waiting period. To me, it did look like
it was a mistake . . . [but] [i]t was mathematically ascertainable and
grammatically written. This was a problem Congress had to fix . . . .
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Q3. [Dictionaries are] [n]ot terribly helpful. If I have an ambiguous
term, a phrase I’m not familiar with, I look at dictionaries to make sure
I’m in the ballpark. I’ve used dictionaries when I was looking at a
constitutional provision or a statute from the Founding era.
Q4 & Q4A. I know for every canon there seems to be an opposite
and equal canon — dueling canons — but those kinds of rules are I
think useful. I don’t think any single one can be definitive because each
has an exception.
I can’t think of an instance where I’ve cited a canon but I’m sure I
have. The linguistic canons are general rules of how we are going to
treat some kind of language — like ejusdem. That rule codifies common
sense. That rule at least tells me something about human nature.
I haven’t thought about the canons globally or divided them into
two camps of language and policy. For example, the rule of lenity. Most
lenity arguments aren’t based on ambiguity, and so there are very few
cases where the rule of lenity has an effect. It’s just a step short of
holding something void for vagueness.
Q5. [On use of legislative history, already answered, says yes.]
Q6. I think understanding Congress helps. It contributes to my
skepticism of how legislative history is created. Anyone who has visited
the gallery of the House or Senate and seen someone lecturing to an
empty chamber will appraise floor statements differently. In the 1991
Bush Administration, there was an amendment to the Civil Rights Act
that oddly was uncontested. The sides agreed there would be no legislative history. That was a really interesting second-order awareness of
the issue of legislative history. It’s unusual to be able to get down into
the weeds of legislative process. I have an example of a recent case
where the parties were going through iterations of congressional drafts
and what language was taken from what draft. I’m willing to look at
it. We do some of that in con law: we look at the original draft of the
Bill of Rights.
Q7. If I thought there was inconsistency in the statute of course I’d
have to figure out how to harmonize it. But if I was aware of a legislative compromise or White House negotiation and there was some kind
of sidebar agreement — if you are aware of such a deal, it’s hard to
ignore it. It’s hard to use it as a rule of interpretation but I’d be affected
by it. But as a judge, I’m not sure I can go to the New York Times or
the Washington Post and say here’s the backstory of how the legislation
was adopted. I’m not sure I can use the New York Times as an interpretive construct for understanding a statute.
Q8. [Not asked.]
Q9. [On pragmatism:] If there are multiple plausible interpretations,
I have no legislative history to look at, no clue from structure, then yes,
I’ll give it the most commonsense interpretation I can.
Q10. You have to be very careful about what you think is absurd.
A majority of our court thought [redacted case name] was absurd, but

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3138249

2018]

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ON THE BENCH

1359

my response was, how could that be? It is perfectly understandable
even if it wasn’t intended, so our job is to let Congress change it. [Regarding the famous “no vehicles in the park” hypothetical:] It would be
so silly. The political consequences to the DA would be significant. I’d
let those consequences flow, as a matter of discipline. Let the DA suffer
the consequences of his silly interpretation. I think part of the consequence of Marbury is that, over time, Congress has stopped reading the
Constitution. It presses the limits of its power, and lets the Court be the
backstop. I don’t think that’s salutary interpretation.
Q11. [On developing the judge’s approach:] As a lawyer at DOJ, I
briefed a large number of cases with statutory questions. As an appellate lawyer in the Justice Department, I didn’t handle anything at trial
and I had to educate myself about statutes I’d never heard of. So every
time I started a case, I had to pull the whole statute to really understand
it in context. That was extremely helpful.
Q12. [On precedential weight of interpretive rules:] The Supreme
Court has such a varied approach to all this, I’m not sure there is a
consistent message being given to us. I don’t go as far as Justice Scalia
does on legislative history. I’m willing to look at it. I don’t think I can
go that far. I think it’s very hard to draw rules from the Supreme Court
because there are always exceptions, like dueling canons.
Q13 & Q14. We have to give some deference when the agency has
given a plausible interpretation. They are a coequal interpreter, they
have a broader perspective on the whole scheme, so I’m on board with
Chevron. However, the agency is not entitled to deference if what it is
doing is expanding its own authority.
Q15. [On one word to describe interpretive approach:] Textualist. I
would add being a contextualist. I’d want to be sure we’d use the rest
of the act as a lexigraphical tool to interpret the whole thing.
Q16. Lawyers are all over the board. It depends on how sophisticated the particular lawyers in the case are. A lot of my clerks may not
have had Washington experience or understand the legislative process.
Sometimes I have to train a clerk what to look for. We are doing a better
job teaching legislation than when I was in law school. I’m not sure it
was recognized as a class, but I’ve found a lot of law schools are offering
classes in legislation. I think we are doing a better job of that. I’m not
sure how much clerks know about the legislative process. They treat all
legislative history alike, for example.
Q17. [Not asked.]
Q18. There is a difference between common law methodology, statutes, and the Constitution. I regard the Constitution as a form of civil
law — our written Constitution was an American innovation, different
from England. And therefore I read the Constitution narrowly, as if it
were a statute. But I do think there is a difference between statutory
law and common law methods. Statutes are easily amended whereas in
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the common law methodology we have to overrule ourselves. I’m careful about statutory interpretation because the Court rarely overrules itself on statutory construction. The Court overturns itself a lot more on
constitutional law than statutory law.
B. Older-Generation Judge/Legal Process Institutionalist
Q1. I want first to see the whole statute not just the section given to
me in the briefing. I look at the precise language. I look at whether
this is a question we have interpreted before and whether the uncertainty in the statute is some type of oversight of draftsmanship or there
really was a decision between A and B. I’m not really interested in what
Congress did or if they kicked the can down to us. If they kicked the
can I am still operating within the overarching guidelines of the statute
itself.
Q2. Plain meaning is a matter of linguistic inference. I use common
sense. If a word is used in a way that’s particular to the statute I take
an inference from the language.
Q3. I don’t get a lot of confidence from the dictionaries. Maybe for
a technical term.
Q4 & Q4A. I think [canons are useful] in the broad sense. There are
guidelines that are helpful, reminders of what I think intuitively is the
answer anyway. Some of the canons are resting on a normative choice
of course but others are basic principles like constitutional avoidance. . . . The clerks add them as signposts. The clerks come back with
detail. I find the writing among clerks to have a wide range of quality.
Working with facts is the hardest. Good trial lawyers can find narratives out of the chaos of facts.
Q5. Sometimes you can get a sense of the case [from legislative history]. Sometimes I tack it on at the end. . . . I follow the law and then
check to make sure it is right. The notion you just ignore it does not
make a lot of sense. The question is what kind of controlling weight to
give to it. You have all sorts of reports, comments, etc., but it sometimes
informs you of issues they considered or wanted. Not for getting down
to the issue of he said this or he said that, but a question about what the
fight was about. What are the stakes? Legislative history helps me to
define when the fight is over.
Q6. It would serve a judge well to have working knowledge of the
realities of the legislative process. Scalia had a keen awareness of that,
a healthy skepticism that informed his textualism. I have never seen
judges being trained on the realities of the legislative process. I would
love to see things on this. They sign onto the words, so it has to be
about the words whatever the process is, but the words can never be the
ending point because what appears to be pretty straightforward becomes unraveled in context.
Q7. [Not asked.]
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Q8. This is common law, interstitial work. It is filling out a statute
to make sense of its natural purpose or to work more efficiently. It goes
back to the question of whether it was an oversight or not.
Q9 & Q10. Congress has given interpretive power to the courts and
in the process of interpreting what Congress has said you are also filling
out what it didn’t say. That’s fair as long as you don’t go too far. That’s
the inherent problem. The legitimacy is based on the federal statute,
but behind that is the inherent grant of authority in the statute to the
judge. You are interpreting and giving meaning to those words. . . .
Everyone reads differently. There is inherent fluidity of language. The
canons are very helpful in reminding people to think about certain
things and reminding judges that their job is not to make new law. A
lot of states have interpretive statutes but we never consult them. . . . It
is very helpful when it comes to legitimacy to have a statute and make
Congress be clear.
Q11. It’s about legitimacy. I try to be faithful to that. I try to do
what the Congress said. I don’t want to adopt an interpretive enterprise
for which I don’t have authority. There is some inherent authority for
when Congress leaves A and B out there, you give it to the court. We
then have implied authority to go one way or the other. A lot of legislation is like that. Another thing Congress does is it enacts agencies as
a backdrop for judicial interpretation and opinions that are already
there. There is legitimacy in looking to that backdrop. When they are
talking about congressional restraints on legislative action, reading statutes in ways that conform to those constraints is not a constraint on
legislative power, it conforms with it. It’s deferential to Congress. The
enterprise for both is about legitimacy. Textualists have certain techniques — canons, accountability, and agency interpretation, all these
things are really trying to move in the direction of a good state of
legitimacy.
Q12. [Question not answered. View that Chevron does not appear
in Constitution was response.]
Q13 & Q14. Congress delegates to administrative agencies. Okay.
It’s a separate question on what grounds Congress has exercised that
power. I understand there is Article I, Article II, and Article III, but
then you’ve got this administrative apparatus. Where is that in the
Constitution? I don’t know the answer. It is intriguing. But we don’t
see any real challenges to it. [Even if there were no Chevron] there still
must be some deference. The deference would still be the same. I don’t
think the deference from the lower federal courts should be greater to
agencies under Chevron. You give deference because the issues are
complex.
Q15. I am a textualist with a very strong streak of pragmatism. I
have become more pragmatic over the years. I find myself asking: is
there really a problem?
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Q16. Some cases I know the answer to. Others I just don’t know
the answer. [If] after reading the briefs and the record I am still uncertain I sit down and I work by long hand. Lawyers often don’t understand the issues — they are often mechanical in their approach.
Q17. [Not asked.]
FOLLOW-UP #1. That eclectic emerged as an overarching description of the responses of thirty-five appellate judges does not surprise.
One can see text, canon, legislative history, etc., as tools or aids to a
judge’s decision as distinct from principles or here, statutory commands
that “control” resolution of a decision; a vision that implicitly offers a
range of choice, a sense of fit and aptness. That is, the task accepts that
the “meaning” of the statute yields no discretion, unlike the choice of
tools for its unlocking, an allowance of judicial “judgment” as the interpretative tool most apt. To the realist this may be seen as mere wordplay. I think it is more, that it reflects judicial reluctance to relinquish
decisional control outright — a clinging to authority that could be
weighed by tendentious animus but may well be little more than differing perceptions of judges of their judicial role. I suspect that many
(most?) judges would see no unfaithfulness to legislative command in
their choice of interpretative tools or variable intensity with which they
are wielded.
FOLLOW-UP #2. Whether a statute is sufficiently malleable to accommodate the accretive force of judicial decision rests in the tautological inquiry of its meaning — how much delegation to the courts is fairly
locatable in text, history, etc., e.g. “unreasonable restraint of trade,”
mindful that the Congress acts against a backdrop of a judicial role that
can serve to smooth out the bumps of the future within the ambits of its
legislative objective. This dialogue between Congress and courts is often plain. See the meandering path of judicially supplied rights of private enforcement to congressional set norms, and the wielding of the
plain statement rule, e.g. stepping on state sovereignty.
FOLLOW-UP #3. When I come to [a] decision in review of the materials of the case runs the full range. To my eyes facts decide more cases
than resolution of conflicting legal principles so in mine-run cases with
settled legal principles, my effort is master the procedural history of the
case and the detail of the facts . . . what happened. As this varies with
the case so follows the temporal point of decision. There remain cases
where law and facts leave me yet uncertain post-argument and conference, not so rare with me. For those I take pen in hand and write ’til I
have an answer.
C. Post-Scalia Canonist/Moderate Textualist #1
Q1. I wish I could say in all cases I have one approach but it is
pretty random. I start a lot of cases with the district court decision.
Sometimes I start with briefs. They often have a pretty good indication
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of what the statute says. If it is easy, it’s easy. If it’s hard then I will
pull my statute out and keep broadening the lens until I figure out
what’s going on. I don’t go to the statute first; I go to the briefs to get
a sense.
Q2. In an area I don’t understand, I don’t think statutory interpretation cases are so different from other cases. I just keep reading until
I get comfortable. If I have to start reading a secondary text, legislative
history, other opinions concerning statutes, I will. I don’t necessarily
rely on everything I have read but I do keep reading. I don’t go out and
do extra research like sample experiments. I am very ecumenical.
I don’t use “plain meaning.” In interesting, challenging cases, we
have the argument in front of us. I take the arguments as they are, so
even if we go another way another court can see what we decided, why
we didn’t ignore the evidence, why we did what we did.
Q3. Dictionaries. Yes, I look at everything. I look at everything to
make sure I am not wrong. I don’t feel limited. On an issue of law, my
gosh, I think the courts should figure it out.
Q4 & Q4A. Yes, we use the canons. This is probably an area where
I am a fan of the Scalia/Garner book. I do agree, but we should be
careful about every one of the canons. I find them useful but I don’t
buy the argument that for every one there is another one. They are
useful. Be careful how you use them. You don’t stop when you see a
canon that resolves the case, you keep reading. I have always accepted
the idea that courts can be consistent. It is useful to everyone. I am a
huge fan of the rule of lenity. I wish it was used even more.
Q5. If I am anxious about an interpretation in front of me I will look
at it [legislative history]. I definitely cite canons more than legislative
history. It’s right to be skeptical. Llewellyn would be more worried
about legislative history: for every instance of legislative history you can
find another one. I doubt I’ve ever used a statement on the floor. The
one thing I use a lot I think is beyond reproach. I am very interested in
the history of legislation. What they did in ’09, ’76, how they changed
the statute. It is very helpful in trying to understand the statutory
background.
Q6. I am agnostic about [the value of judges understanding the legislative process]. I think it is helpful for a multimember court to have a
lot of different backgrounds. It would be helpful to have a legislator on
the court but I don’t think we need more politics on the courts. But yes,
it would be useful in FJC training. For someone like me I would go and
I would learn things but it probably wouldn’t affect me because I am
very much where John Manning is on this. There are compromises.
Learning the process won’t help judges with that essential problem of
not being able to get into the statutory deals. All you can do is look at
the text agreed on. I agree with John Manning.
Q7. [On interpreting statutes to be consistent:] For terms of a statute
enacted twenty years apart then yes that’s an example of a canon that
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is imperfect but it is one worth following. It is a good thing to impose
coherence. It is unfair to ask the reader to see terms of the statute differently. I get a little more nervous about one statute presuming consistency with other statutes. You have to be regional about it.
Q8. I extrapolate the purpose from legislative history but I have
anxiety about cherry-picking. Legislative history gives judges a lot of
options and expands the options but there is nothing wrong with that.
Q9. When it is obvious that Congress didn’t contemplate the thing
at all that’s really hard. That is a good place to have canons and be
consistent about it. Using canons consistently is a good thing. The
instinct to do the interpretation that makes the most sense versus one
that is canon driven is a hard tension. But I would probably pick the
canons approach. I want to make the canons work with my policy instinct but I would probably side with the canon.
Q10. Like most judges, when I get a case, I want to make it work.
I want to make things coherent, and work better. I definitely start with
that orientation, but I also am not afraid to say, “this is the language of
a statute and is just too high of a hurdle.” I am a big fan of judges
taking that instinct and making sure the legislature knows about the
problem. I’m not afraid to concur and let Congress or the Court know
this is a problem. That can be very effective, especially in the Supreme
Court, to concur.
Q11. I developed my approach by trial and error. I worked for two
very different judges before. I read the literature both of you guys write.
My fear of getting it wrong is a big driver for me.
Q12. I see myself associated with the methodological developments
since the 1980s. I start with the text; I don’t jump to purpose so quickly.
I don’t see myself bound by Supreme Court methodology, but I do it
because I kind of agree with them. But methodological change happens.
It happened with King v. Burwell. That was a big moment. But it isn’t
math. It isn’t a science, but I do think about the case in terms of hierarchy, like text first and as I go down the ladder I tend to think of things
as less valuable and that’s not bad. I don’t even think the Court even
thinks it is establishing methodological rules. The one thing I think
would be valuable is I don’t think we do a very good job in our conferences or opinions specifying where it is methodologically we are
disagreeing.
Q13 & Q14. I find the whole administrative law thing fascinating.
It is shifting a bit. The Court is really reassessing Chevron itself. The
last five, six, seven years I have paid a lot of attention to those cases. In
my court when we get those cases and there is a lot of ambiguity I find
myself not necessarily being as deferential as we were. I am sensing
more skepticism among myself and my colleagues about deference and
legal interpretation. I tend to be more deferential about factfinding.
The whole idea behind Chevron is about the policy backbone, but what
about implied delegation of judicial power?
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Q15. I don’t even know what the labels mean. I know lots of textualists who don’t do what I do and I know lots of purposivists that
aren’t doing that either. I think there is a hierarchy, things that are most
helpful. I am a “quasi contextualist,” maybe.
Q16. Law clerks are the only friends I have! There are some limits
as to what clerks can do. There is something wonderful about working
with these smart people who are really excited and want to find answers.
Several of my best opinions are ones that came out of back and forth
with the clerks. I am very happy with what the law students are doing.
We didn’t have this course[, legislation,] when I was in school. As for
the lawyers, yes and no, it depends. Lawyers from small practices you
shouldn’t expect them to do all this stuff. The older you get the more
you can recognize the difference of the lawyers. I don’t even feel obligated to read all the briefs from some of these practices.
Q17. I don’t have any complaints [about how the federal courts are
handling statutory cases or on the level of guidance currently from the
Supreme Court].
D. Post-Scalia Canonist/Moderate Textualist #2
Q1. I don’t even know I have a statutory interpretation case until I
see the district court opinion. I always start with the district court opinion and then go to the briefs. I look at where the clause in question sits
in the context — I look at where statutory provisions sit in the statute.
I try to figure out what’s the real text and where it sits.
Q2. [Redacted to preserve confidentiality.] [When there is ambiguity] one possibility is that this is a statute giving powers to an agency —
and in that case the agency can do whatever they want. If Congress has
delegated to an agency, the rationale for letting the agency do something
more, whether using policy or legislative history — stuff I try not to
do — the rationale for the agency is that this is something that’s been
done by Congress, it’s been dropped to the executive branch by
Congress and if the executive branch isn’t making a complete ass of
itself, it has political legitimacy. If there is no agency and it’s a pure
litigation statute, the question is whether it’s been delegated to us and
if yes we should do something sensible. In my world, that’s statutes like
the Sherman Act. We proceed in common law fashion. I put that statute
down and do not pretend there is an answer in the statute and find the
answer in some other area of law. I don’t torture the statute to produce
an answer. If there’s no answer, torture won’t produce it. The question
is then whether judges have authority to produce their own answer and
they should then fess up that it’s their own answer. Mead re-rationalizes
Chevron as a case about delegation. If the contention is: this is ambiguous, then there is delegation. But in Chevron itself, much of what
was going on in the Clean Air Act is that Congress had spotted a problem and told them to solve the problem of air pollution. That was a real
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delegation. A lot of times judges are talking about delegation, but nothing has really been delegated to the agency. Then I’m skeptical about
using the Chevron approach. A lot of delegations are real and Chevron
itself is a great example.
Q3. I’m not very confident about dictionaries. Dictionaries are
words about how words have been used but don’t tell you how words
are used this time. What can be true about dictionaries is that uses of
words change over time. If you are using a statute like the Rules of
Decision Act, a midcentury statute, you ask how would Congress have
understood the word “law” — would they have thought it means common law? We are such positivists we can’t understand how “law” was
used back then. I’d prefer to look at public debates to figure out what
language means, but I’d rather look at Blackstone than to figure out
myself what I think about the word now because I just don’t know what
they thought.
Q4. I mention [canons] largely to mock them. I’ve written opinions
contrasting the canons like that the specific supersedes the general, etc.
Karl Llewellyn was largely right about the canons, there are too many.
One of the ones I particularly dislike is avoidance of constitutional questions — why shouldn’t judges work hard to interpret constitutional
questions?
[Redacted.] [There is a] principle of parsimony in language. Someone says “bring me an ashtray” — “one that isn’t already nailed down”
is implicit in that conversation. Everyone but a maniac understands
that. You can conserve on language. The “cooperative principle” —
assume the speaker and the listener are cooperating, that is really a formula for some canons — like ejusdem generis, that’s a form of the cooperative principle of speech, you assume the person can use the listed
examples to make clear what they are talking about. I’m skeptical of
the canons as if they were rules — many of them are just built into the
way we talk. Now having said that, I’m less certain about how much
cooperation we should assume. Many statutes aren’t written on the
assumption that people or judges are cooperating — like tax statutes
aren’t written thinking about how others are cooperating. When statutes are written to tie citizens’ or judges’ hands, then it’s a mistake to
believe that language is going to be construed cooperatively.
The rule of lenity? Do you call it a canon or constitutional principle?
I view it as shorthand for [the] proposition that judges aren’t supposed
to create crime. The mail fraud statute is repeatedly the worst example
in modern times. The McNally case cuts back on the mail fraud statute,
Congress tries to reenact part of it, then Skilling cuts back on it again,
that seems entirely proper. There is nothing there in the statute. That’s
entirely understandable. I don’t know whether to call it a canon or an
understanding of a constitutional norm about allocation of powers in
government.
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Other things are also called canons, like clear statement rules. I
don’t think that’s a canon for interpreting a statute that tells you about
the meaning of the statute. Same with private rights of action, but it
tells you what happens unless words say something. There may have
been a compromise in Congress, we don’t know what it was. Thank
goodness the Supreme Court doesn’t deal with Borak anymore and imply private rights of action to get more enforcement. Like everything
else, law is expensive. There is a limited amount of it.
Q5. [On legislative history:] [Redacted.] The rules of civil procedure
come with the notes. In these cases, those background docs are very
useful. Also the meaning of some text depends on how interpreters
speak so if there is some ambiguity, I don’t think there is a rule against
listening to how the committee used language — just as you’d look at
how the New York Times uses language. The example is the case imposing tax on fruit [Nix v. Hedden]: does the interpreting committee
think like a school child and/or like botanists? The judges looked at
legislative history and the New York Times and concluded that both
Congress and the general community thought like school children and
not like botanists. Scalia has said that he too approves of using legislative history in this way.
Q6. Knowing something about the legislative process is helpful, but
I don’t agree with the whole-act rule. That canon strikes me as particularly wacky. Statutes get amended dozens of times by numerous different political coalitions. It’s so long no one can figure out what’s in it,
the idea that something put in the act in 1976 should be read the same
way if it uses the same language if that language is put in thirty years
later is ludicrous. If [Professor Akhil] Amar wants people to read the
same word in the Constitution the same way even if it was a word from
1787 compared to 1867 — it makes sense to read the original text in the
same way because it all went through Wilson’s committee on details —
he did everything he could to make that polyglot document consistent
but beyond that I’m skeptical.
Q7. [Consistency:] It depends what kind of statute we are using. If
you are looking at something like the Clean Air Act, enacted by so many
different coalitions, making it consistent makes no sense, far better to
look at what sense EPA has made of it and accept it unless it’s wacky.
If you are looking on the other hand at a single statute enacted in short
language at one time, treating phrase A to undermine phrase B would
really just make a mess of things. So you should try to make them work
together — that’s a more sensible project, using rules of grammar, etc.
Q8, Q9 & Q10. I do like the fact that Scalia and Garner says we
don’t presume that Congress knows everything but we act as though
they did because better to save than destroy. That’s sensible. I think
safe to presume Congress doesn’t even read what it enacts that day.
Nancy Pelosi on the Affordable Care Act said: “We have to enact it to
see what’s in it.”

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3138249

1368

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:1298

Q11. [Not asked.]
Q12. [Relevance of the Supreme Court’s methodology:] They increasingly cite dictionaries. I think legislative history use has gone
down. Does their methodology bind us? To the same extent that it
binds them. If they say our statutory methodology is we allow agencies
to resolve ambiguity using things like legislative history and policy then
that Chevron rule binds us because they say that’s our interpretive rule.
But on the question does one resort to legislative history, they have all
said in majority opinions that unless the statute is ambiguous, legislative
history shouldn’t be used. I think that’s binding. On the question of
what makes a statute ambiguous, they haven’t said what makes a statute ambiguous so there is nothing binding. They haven’t announced a
rule about that. Or on the questions that divide textualists like me and
pragmatists like you — you have textualists and pragmatists on the
Supreme Court and neither of them has been squelched by the other so
why would judges on the courts of appeals feel squelched either way?
Just because they haven’t [announced binding methodological rules]
doesn’t mean they can’t. [Professor] Nick Rosenkranz wrote an article
called Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation. He says they could do
this. I’m kind of glad we don’t have Acts Interpretation Acts — other
nations include every canon from Llewellyn’s table. Sometimes states
enact these things but they aren’t always followed. [References to
Gluck’s and other literatures here omitted.]
Q13 & Q14. [See answers to Q2.]
Q15. [One word:] I don’t think there is any difference between textualist and contextualist, if there was it’s eroded. I think that all good
textualists are contextualists.
Q16. We have a few reasonably sophisticated lawyers. My law clerks
are much more helpful. At oral argument, lawyers are so defensive and
scripted; it’s very hard to have a real conversation with them.
Q17. [Not asked.]
Q18. Constitutional law and statutory interpretation are on one side.
We’re supposed to be carrying out someone else’s charge. The common
law is very different. In the common law world, where there’s a statutory delegation like the Sherman Act or a constitutional delegation like
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, then we are the primary anchor. You have a different approach when you are carrying out other
people’s commands than when you are trying to figure out the best answer. The first thing you do is figure out whether the federal common
law is legitimate. Look at ERISA, for example, figure out whether the
job of making a federal common law of contracts is tasked to us and
then own up to the idea we are making it up. That’s a real common
law power, it was tasked to us but we shouldn’t look at a statute and
say “I can’t see they’ve passed power to me” but decide it anyway. If
there isn’t something you can look to to figure it out either the statutory
case isn’t justiciable or there is a common law power in courts and
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courts should say we are deciding this on [our] own and we aren’t blaming you. Judges don’t say that they are but they should.
E. “Ex-Staffer”: Younger-Generation Judge with Some
Capitol Hill Experience
Q1. It depends [where to start]. There are some statutes where there
is so much precedent that you don’t even look at the statutory text, you
just read the cases, like 1983 or AEDPA. But a statute with less ground
I start with the text but always text in context, I never just read a phrase.
Q2. It is unclear what is meant by the phrase “plain meaning.” But
yes. Because I read it. I read plainly, so when I read it, what it seems
to be plays a role.
Q3. No dictionaries, unless it’s a medical case [then] I look in a medical dictionary. My law clerks look at it, everybody does that now. They
all give me dictionary definitions. It drives me crazy.
Q4. I find the second category [policy canons] — I find those helpful.
In a close case they actually inform my thinking. Linguistic canons, to
be honest, I use after I have made up my mind to help draft the opinion.
It’s a good argument after the fact. If it fits the bill, even if it is not
central to my thinking, if I think it will help someone else organize their
thoughts I will throw it in.
Q4A. I couldn’t do the job without access to legislative history. The
canons that I find that are not helpful are the ones that presume a kind
of artistry on Congress for drafting statutes.
Q5. Yes, definitely [I use legislative history]. I have not yet had a
case where I went back and did an exhaustive search for legislative history. I am working now for instance on a [redacted] case. I have seen
this statute before. I know Congress wanted a broad application [from]
the legislative history so I used it and I find it helpful but I haven’t had
to do a law office full legislative history myself.
Q6. I do think this would be helpful [for judges to understand more
about Congress]. I worked on [Capitol Hill] . . . I am no master of the
intricacies about how Congress works but I do have a healthy understanding. You need to understand there is a slapdash quality to what
happens. You should not expect a level of precision in statutes that isn’t
there. It is a healthy understanding to have to understand stuff that
comes out of the process. No one has thought so much about comma
placement, etc.
Q7. I don’t worry much about [consistency]. Using the same word
the same way across the statutes. I have only had one case where there
was real scrivener’s error. I was prepared to construe that statute the
way Congress actually meant it.
Q8 & Q9. Yes, [I will use purpose,] that’s part of how to resolve
ambiguity. Yes, I am going to read it the way Congress intended. When
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there is no ambiguity and you have to add something that Congress did
not add, that’s harder.
Q10. Yes. For a total absurd result, it is easy. You could trace the
process and see how Congress got it wrong. That would be an easy case
for not going with what was there. I would work really hard to find
enough ambiguity to avoid an absurd result.
Q11. [On developing an interpretive approach:] I go case by case. I
am so not a theorist. But we have informative experiences. I clerked
for [redacted] [on the Court] and that term we had some bare-knuckle
brawls with Justice Scalia about legislative history. You take away from
that a pretty deep resistance to the kind of Scalia approach to text and
appreciate looking at the statute more as a whole thinking about what
Congress had in mind. More of a commonsense approach.
Q12. [On precedential weight of interpretive rules:] I can imagine a
case where it sounds more like binding precedent on a particular statute,
like for this statute look at legislative history, but not at the level of
generality that they do it now. They are so incompetent I don’t know
what to do.
Q13. [On whether the judge treats cases that come from district
court differently from ones concerning agencies:] Because of Chevron?
Yes. Apart from Chevron not really, but yes. You have to layer on top
of it this really strong deference.
Q14. I do think Chevron is sensible. We don’t get many agency
cases. At some level I like Chevron because it makes my job easier.
Also, for me to think myself expert enough to go head to head with an
agency would be a huge amount of work.
Q15. Definitely not literalist or textualist. I like common sense.
Q16. Coming out of law school [law clerks] tend to know the Scalia
and Garner approach pretty well. They may be more textualist than I
am. They often give me five to eight pages of statutory text rather than
really getting into the cases. I would love to get my law clerks past that.
My law clerks care about statutes. I think lawyers are helpful. They
are informative about the purpose of the statute.
Q17. As of right now I am more comfortable getting less guidance
from the Supreme Court because I don’t know what it would be. If
Congress could pay more attention to remedies and retroactivity and
stuff like that when they are drafting it would be a lot better. It would
be better if Congress would think through the application of that statute,
who gets to sue, what do they get to sue for, that would be helpful. In
my court we don’t have any real statutory interpretation theorists running around trying to rule things out so I am very comfortable where
my court is.
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F. D.C. Circuit Judge
Q1. I start with the standards of review and precedent so I know
what my responsibilities are, and if it’s an agency case whether I need
to apply deference, that’s where I start.
Q2. Again, it depends on context. I’m looking for plain meaning
first — I look for common usage, context and purpose of statute — that
alone tells me if it’s plain meaning and that will end it alone. But if
deference is due it’s entirely different. I’m looking to see if the agency
has built-in authority. And then if it’s manifestly unreasonable or contrary to law. We have lots of agency cases so this is what we do all the
time.
Q3. If I don’t know the meaning or if [there is] more than one possible meaning I will sometimes go to dictionary use, but then I’d use
more than one dictionary. I don’t have a method of picking dictionaries
and that’s why I choose several — to make sure they all have a common
meaning and agree. I only look at a dictionary if I’m scratching my
head about the word. I don’t go there a lot.
Q4 & Q4A. I can’t say I understand the differences between presumptions and canons, and all the different kinds. Some like the rule
against superfluities, or that Congress is presumed to act within the
bounds of the Constitution, or consistent usage, or presumptions against
retroactive effect, and implied repeals, those things do come up and can
be helpful guides in some cases and yes, we use them.
Q5. Occasionally I use legislative history. I think everyone is a little
skeptical of legislative history and with good reason, but it has some
purpose. I think committee reports are probably the best you can
get — if there is something to be had out of it. A committee report that
reflects the views of both houses, both parties. The sponsor/opponent
statements are helpful to understand[ing] what the battle is all about —
it’s not too illuminating but it helps me size up the issue. I certainly
would not pin my judgment on legislative history, but it’s illuminating
and helps me understand the fight.
Q6. [In response to the question about making statutes drafted by
multiple committees consistent:] For me that’s a “whoa” moment, but if
judges start worrying about that we are asking for trouble. It’s the
statute that’s enacted and we have to live with it. It’s a terrible mistake
if we start fooling around with that info. Congress has got to understand
how we are going to operate even if these assumptions are fictitious. I
don’t much care if a twenty-six-year-old who didn’t go to law school
wrote a section. Just like you don’t want to figure out when law clerks
do the drafting. The public doesn’t say, well wait, that’s an issue. I
have no interest in knowing who is doing the drafting — just look at
final product. . . . I do think it’s important to understand Congress, because any knowledge is useful, but there are cases where that kind of
info can be useful. . . .

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3138249

1372

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:1298

Q7. Not a chance [that I try to interpret the legislative deal]. That’s
off base to me. I don’t trust a lot of my colleagues, if I can do that they
can do it too! I’m not going there. That’s what they wrote. If it turns
out they are very unhappy with what they wrote then revise it.
Q8 & Q9. Yes, I cite purpose — purpose is very much part of the
interpretive process, especially if it’s there to be found and you aren’t
guessing. Purpose, structure, organization are really important. The
[Affordable Care Act] subsidies case; the purpose of Congress was evident, it couldn’t be missed. But that was different because it was a
Chevron case too. Purpose matters a lot.
Q10 & Q11. [Not asked.].
Q12. [On interpretive precedents from the Supreme Court:] I don’t
think their approaches are a useful guide. I don’t much focus on approaches like textualism because I don’t really know what it is, it’s different in different cases. I very much follow precedents. There are
certain frameworks in which appellate courts can and should operate
and I’m comfortable with it. If they want to reverse it they can. I don’t
worry about who’s on what side of a 5–4 vote and who interprets in
what way.
Q13 & Q14. [On Chevron:] I’ve gotten to the point where I don’t
much care, I can understand both sides of it. It does establish a framework that keeps us somewhat confined. The ultimate question is should
the agency have a major role or not, and the Supreme Court has decided
yes they should, and Congress hasn’t overturned that judgment which
they could have done. I’m just not sure that without the framework
judges would do a better job than agencies. What I’ve come to believe
is that as long as we are within a clear framework, it confines us in good
ways. I think Chevron is relatively clear, I think Chevron has some
blurry edges and can be argued over sometimes and I love seeing scholars argue over step one and two, but in our circuit we have gotten into
a routine in applying it. . . .
Q15. I won’t pin myself to one word. The places I start all the time
are what’s my standard of review in this case, is the agency entitled to
deference, and is there a precedent. That’s how I start. If I’ve got text,
I’m certainly looking to see if there is plain meaning, then purpose, context, and structure. But standard of review and precedent are always
in the case.
Q16. [On the role of lawyers/law clerks:] It depends on the lawyers
and the clerks. The percentage of good lawyers on cases isn’t as high
as I’d like. They aren’t my guiding light either way. [Law clerks] are
looking more to learn from us. They know something about Chevron
and canons, but haven’t seen them in real context and really just want
to learn.
Q17. [Not asked.].
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Q18. I think judges have a limited role, but an important role, and
I try my best to understand that role and act accordingly. I think constitutional questions and answers are more malleable based on the nature of the document and the history of inquiry. It’s much looser. I
don’t feel that way about statutory interpretation. I feel there is a railroad track and I take the train. Common law we don’t see it so much,
so I don’t even know what to say about it. It is common law in the
loose sense in terms of developing meaning in statutes but not common
law in the traditional sense.
FOLLOW-UP #1. If you meant an eclectic approach as distinguished
from a categorical approach, then, yes, I agree that this is generally the
approach followed by the appellate judges with whom I have worked.
In my view, it is an approach that lies somewhere in between the theses
espoused by Richard Fallon (The Meaning of Legal “Meaning”), and
Eskridge and Frickey (“funnel of abstraction”). “Reasonable meaning”
might be a good description, but not in the narrow way that Hart and
Sacks defined reasoned decisionmaking. In any event, in my view, there
is no controlling categorical approach that is routinely applied in every
case. Context (meaning the question before the court) matters. And
judicial deliberations matter.
FOLLOW-UP #2. We construe the statute as written. It is not the
role of judges to “update” statutes. There are many cases that present
statutory questions that Congress did not foresee when drafting. Statutory purpose and language guide us.
FOLLOW-UP #3. It is not possible to answer this question. My assessments of cases vary from case to case.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3138249

